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Local Government Law
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
In the early 1950's, condemnation was rare and political suicide. A
popular limited access road was being delayed by a farmer. When the
State survey crew showed up, the farmer was standing at a fence with
his shotgun. He never moved, but the survey crew would not go
beyond the fence.
After the Attorney General, District Attorney, and Sheriff failed, the
assignment devolved to the County Attorney. I walked up to the fence.
"John, we have known each other a long time." "You take one step
further," replied the farmer, "and we will not know each other for a
longer time."'

The more things change in the ethereal realms of local government law,
the more they remain the same.
I.
A.

MUNICIPALITIES

Officers and Employees

The wheels of local government go around, but they are propelled by
its officers and employees-inevitably, conflicts arise in the ranks.
Representing a considerable stand-off between the municipal mayor and
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members of the council, Griffin v. City Council of Milledgeville2 focused
upon a local statute3 changing the municipality's form of government.'
Objecting to his conversion from "strong" to "weak" mayor,5 the plaintiff
challenged the statute's validity on assorted grounds.6 Affirming the
trial court's rejection of those challenges, the supreme court perused the
charter amendment from several perspectives. 7 Initially, the court
refuted the mayor's contention that his office had been unlawfully
abolished.' "The office still involves the performance of numerous
duties," 9 the court observed, and "the mayor.., remains mayor, albeit
a 'weak' mayor rather than a 'strong' mayor."' ° Additionally, the court
rejected the mayor's equal-protection arguments of personal vindictiveness and of racial discrimination." No evidence rebutted the council's
stated purpose of accomplishing a more efficient city government, 12 the
court reasoned, nor had the plaintiff's proof
raised "even an inference...
3
[of] further[ing] racial discrimination."
Terminated municipal employees sought solace during the survey
period from the court of appeals, with mixed results. In Reid v.City of
Albany,'4 a former at-will employee protested his dismissal from the
engineering department, alleging "he was terminated in retaliation for

2. 279 Ga. 835, 621 S.E.2d 734 (2005). The plaintiff sought to enjoin the statute's
operation. Id. at 835, 621 S.E.2d at 735.
3. 2003 Ga. Laws 3661.
4. Griffin, 279 Ga. at 835, 621 S.E.2d at 735.
5. Id. Under the local statute amending the charter, 'most of the mayor's substantive
administrative duties would be handled by a city manager answerable only to the council."
Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The plaintiff contended that the statute violated O.C.G.A. section 1-3-11 (2000),
declaring that "a local or special act cannot abolish an office to which a person has been
elected during the term for which such person was elected unless the change is approved
in a referendum by the voters affected by the change." Id. at 837, 621 S.E.2d at 736.
8. Id. at 837, 621 S.E.2d at 736.
9. Id. at 838, 621 S.E.2d at 736. One of those remaining duties, the court emphasized,
included the casting of a vote to break a council tie, 'a not inconsiderable power given a
city council composed of six members." Id.
10. Id. "Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 1-3-11 prohibits the Legislature from altering the nature
of the duties that devolve upon the holder of an office as long as the remaining duties are
appropriate to the office." Id.
11. Id. at 839-40, 621 S.E.2d at 737-38. The plaintiff constituted the municipality's
first African-American mayor. Id. at 836, 621 S.E.2d at 735.
12. Id. at 839, 621 S.E.2d at 737. The court quoted a statement by a council member
that the charter amendment "'doesn't have anything to do with who the mayor is.'" Id.
13. Id., 621 S.E.2d at 738. The court thus affirmed the trial court's summary judgment
for the defendants. Id. at 839-40, 621 S.E.2d at 738.
14. 276 Ga. App. 171, 622 S.E.2d 875 (2005).
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reporting his superior's wrongful use of city resources."15 "Under
Georgia law," affirmed the court, "at-will employees may be terminated
for any or no reason, and they generally cannot recover for wrongful
discharge.""
Contrarily, the "cause" or "reason" assumed pivotal
significance in City of Atlanta v. Harper,7 the court's review of an
internal auditor's termination.' Emphasizing the plaintiff's civil service
status, as well as the city's reliance upon its "reduction in force"
ordinance," the court found sufficient evidence supporting the civil
service board's reinstatement. 0 On the one hand, the ordinance
authorized termination only "because of lack of work, shortage of funds
or reorganization."2' On the other hand, "there was direct and indirect
evidence that [the plaintiff's] severance had resulted from unacceptable
work performance-a circumstance expressly outside the purview of [the
ordinance]. " 22

Matters of municipal pensions and retirements concluded the litigated
concerns of the survey period. In City of Atlanta v. Southern States
Police Benevolent Ass'n of Georgia,23 the court of appeals interpreted
local statutes and charter provisions involving the independence of three

15. Id. at 172, 622 S.E.2d at 877.
16. Id. at 171, 622 S.E.2d at 877. As for the plaintiffs claim that the defendant
falsified information concerning him to the state department of labor, the court observed
these allegations might implicate criminal responsibility, but "[n]othing in the statutes...
authorizes a wrongful discharge claim on this basis...." Id. at 173, 622 S.E.2d at 878.
The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs action. Id.
17. 276 Ga. App. 460, 623 S.E.2d 553 (2005).
18. Id. at 460-61, 623 S.E.2d at 554. The issue on appeal was whether the superior
court erred in denying the city's petition for certiorari when the city had terminated the
employee and the city's civil service board had reinstated him. Id.
19. ATLANTA,GA., ORDINANCE ch. 114, art. IV, div. 12, § 114-379 (1977); Harper, 276
Ga. App. at 461-62, 623 S.E.2d at 555. "At the Board hearing, the City claimed that [the
plaintiffs] termination was authorized by City Ordinance 114-379, entitled 'Layoff or
reduction in force."' Harper, 276 Ga. App. at 462, 623 S.E.2d at 555. The employee
contended that the city was "misapplying [the] Ordinance ... to mask a wrongful
severance." Id. at 463, 623 S.E.2d at 555.
20. Harper, 276 Ga. App. at 465, 623 S.E.2d at 557. The court emphasized its "any
evidence" standard of review. Id. at 461, 623 S.E.2d at 554 (quoting City of Atlanta Gov't
v. Smith, 228 Ga. App. 864, 865, 493 S.E.2d 51, 52 (1997)).
21. Id. at 462, 623 S.E.2d at 555. The ordinance itself directed city compliance with
"two factors: length of service and performance appraisal." Id. at 464-65, 623 S.E.2d at
556. Said the court: "[Tihere is nothing in the record indicating that the two-step process
employed to restructure the Office incorporated retention points." Id. at 465, 623 S.E.2d
at 556.
22. Id. at 464, 623 S.E.2d at 556. The court thus affirmed the trial court's denial of the
city's petition for certiorari. Id. at 465, 623 S.E.2d at 557.
23. 276 Ga. App. 446, 623 S.E.2d 557 (2005).
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city pension fund organizations.2 4 More specifically, the court held, the
boards of trustees for those funds possessed "broad authority to appoint
a third-party administrator to perform benefit administration services,"
independent of the municipality itself.25 Additionally, those same
provisions empowered "the pension boards to independently hire outside
legal counsel to advise them on their authority and duties without input
or interference from the City ...Law Department.""6 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the trial court's issuance of a declaratory
judgment and
27
permanent injunction against the municipality.
Finally, in Westmoreland v. Westmoreland,28 the supreme court drew
upon equity's historic power to change an employee's retirement
beneficiary. 29 The court sketched the prerequisites: the employee
intended to change beneficiaries for all his benefits; he requested forms
for doing so; and he completed all forms given him. ° "The only reason
he did not complete the form relating to the [retirement] plan at issue
is because the human resources employee mistakenly never gave it to
him."3 ' Affirming the trial court's direction that benefits be paid to the

24. Id. at 453-57, 623 S.E.2d at 564-67. The plaintiffs were participants in three city
pension funds (police, fire, and general) who sought a declaratory judgment as to their
powers, as well as an injunction to prevent the city's interference with their actions. Id.
at 446-47, 623 S.E.2d at 560.
25. Id. at 455, 623 S.E.2d at 565. The court construed that authority from local
statutes and charter provisions authorizing the boards "'to manage'" the funds and "'make
all rules'" for payments, and "'to see that the provisions of the Act are carried out.'" Id.
"Any other reading of these provisions would unnecessarily curtail the authority of the
pension boards to carry out their fiduciary responsibilities for the benefit of public
employees in a flexible and efficient manner." Id.
26. Id. at 457, 623 S.E.2d at 566. As for the statutory language concerning the city
attorney, the court said that "this language does not impose a duty upon the respective
pension boards to obtain approval from the City Legal Department before hiring or
consulting with outside counsel. Rather, it imposes a duty upon the Law Department to
provide free legal services to the pension boards, when those boards otherwise request it."
Id., 623 S.E.2d at 566-67.
27. Id. at 447, 623 S.E.2d at 560. "There is nothing in the record affirmatively showing
that the trial court failed to weigh and balance the conveniences of the parties before
granting plaintiffs a permanent injunction." Id. at 460, 623 S.E.2d at 568.
28. 280 Ga. 33, 622 S.E.2d 328 (2005).
29. Id. at 34-35, 622 S.E.2d at 329-30. •The municipal employer had filed the
interpleader action to determine whether the deceased employee's retirement benefits
should be paid to the designated beneficiary or the intended beneficiary. Id. at 34, 622
S.E.2d at 329.
30. Id. at 33-34, 622 S.E.2d at 329. The employee had changed the beneficiary on the
three benefit packages for which he received forms. Id.
31. Id. at 34, 622 S.E.2d at 329.
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intended beneficiary,3 2 the court explained that "'[elquity considers that
'3
done which ought to be done and directs its relief accordingly.'
B.

Powers
The local government operates in sundry capacities and in response to
limitless confrontations-it exercises whatever powers the contest calls
to hand. The municipality's powers as a landlord soared to fruition in
S.S. Air, Inc. v. City of Vidalia, 4 the city's dispossessory action to
remove an airplane hangar from its property at the defendants' expense.
Reviewing evidence that the defendants had maintained the hangar on
city property rent-free since 2001,"5 the court of appeals determined
that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties.36
Moreover, the court reasoned, "[e]vidence supports the conclusion that,
despite its size, the hangar was a trade fixture."" As tenants at will,
the defendants were "obligated to remove their
trade fixture ...at their
38
own expense upon the request of the City."

C. Regulation
In the regulatory maze that is modern-day government, controversy
looms perpetual.39 On the whole, municipal regulatory power fared
rather poorly in the appellate courts over the review period. In Folsom

32. Id. at 35, 622 S.E.2d at 329-30. The court reasoned that the employee's actions
amounted to vastly more than a mere expression of intent to change beneficiaries without
an overt act. Id.
33. Id., 622 S.E.2d at 329 (brackets in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 23-1-8 (1982 &
Supp. 2006)).
34. 278 Ga. App. 149, 628 S.E.2d 117 (2006).
35. Id. at 150, 628 S.E.2d at 119. 'No formal lease agreement exists between the City
and [the defendants] that requires them to pay rent to the City for allowing them to
maintain their hangar on City property." Id., 628 S.E.2d at 118.
36. Id., 628 S.E.2d at 119. "A landlord-tenant relationship may exist even where the
purported tenant is not required to pay rent...." Id.
37. Id. at 151, 628 S.E.2d at 119. "The hangar was bolted to the ground in such a way
that it could be disassembled and rebuilt elsewhere." Id.
38. Id. at 152, 628 S.E.2d at 120 (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-7-12 (1991 & Supp. 2006)).
39. For treatment of municipal regulatory power in an assortment of contexts, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., "Ascertainable Standards" versus 'Unbridled Discretion" in Local
Government Regulation, 41 GA. COUNTY GOV'T. MAG. 19 (Dec. 1989); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REv. 614 (1974); R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Local Government Law and Liquor Licensing:A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REV. 1039
(1981); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit in Georgia Local
Government Law, 9 GA. L. REv. 115 (1974).
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4" the supreme
v.City of Jasper,
court sustained a challenge to the
validity of a city ordinance prohibiting "advertisement[s] of any kind
advertising alcoholic beverages for sale or advertising the brand names
or prices of alcoholic beverages."41 Initially, the court reasoned, "[t]he
City has provided no evidence whatsoever that the ban on alcohol
advertising will 'significantly advance the [City's] interest in promoting
temperance.'"4 2 Additionally, the municipality had failed to show the
measure's restriction on speech to be "no more extensive than necessary."4" Finally, the court condemned the city's license-revocation
power should the council determine "that the licensee is guilty of 'any
violation of federal or state law.""' Finding "no ascertainable standards" limiting the council's decision, the court held that "absolute
discretion in both the determination of the occurrence of the violation as
well as the relevance of the violation does not comport" with due
process.45
It was the court of appeals's interpretation of the regulation that
worked adversely to municipal interests in Northside Corp. v. City of
Atlanta.46 There, an ordinance4 v prohibited expanding a "location"
licensed as a package store and situated within a stated distance of a

40. 279 Ga. 260, 612 S.E.2d 287 (2005). The plaintiff challenged the city's thirty-day
suspension of her liquor license and imposition of a one-year probationary period imposed
after the city found the plaintiff guilty of three violations of the alcoholic beverages
ordinance. Id. at 260, 612 S.E.2d at 288.
41. Id. at 260, 612 S.E.2d at 289 (brackets in original). The court tested the ordinance
as a "'blanket prohibition on truthful, non-misleading speech,'" employing "the four-part
test for commercial speech, originally set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v.Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York [447 U.S. 557 (1980)]." Folsom, 279
Ga. at 261, 612 S.E.2d at 289.
42. Folsom, 279 Ga. at 262, 612 S.E.2d at 290 (brackets in original). The court
forcefully rejected the city's "speculation" that restricting information regarding alcohol
sales would reduce both underage drinking and fortuitous drinking. Id.
43. Id. "[T]he City has numerous other means to reduce alcohol consumption without
curtailing speech." Id.
44. Id. at 263, 612 S.E.2d at 290.
45. Id. at 264, 612 S.E.2d at 291-92. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's
judgment upholding the city's punishment of the plaintiff. Id. at 265, 612 S.E.2d at 292.
46. 275 Ga. App. 30, 619 S.E.2d 691 (2005). Indeed, the issue of interpretation itself
loomed large in the case as the trial court had refused to interpret the zoning ordinance,
reasoning that its only function was to determine the reasonableness of the zoning board's
interpretation. Id. at 30, 619 S.E.2d at 692. Holding that approach applicable only to
reviewing zoning board decisions and not to the interpretation of a zoning ordinance, the
court of appeals proceeded to construe the ordinance. Id.
47. ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCE § 16-28.024 (repealed in full by ordinance number 200515, § 1 (2005)).
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residential district.4
Under that prohibition, the city denied the
plaintiff a building permit to add floor space to his store thus situated,
on grounds that enlarging the store would expand the "location."49
Rejecting that position and advancing an approach of "strict construction,"5 the court held that the ordinance's reference to "location"
pertained to "the entire parcel of land, which would not expand with the
[store's] addition.""' This interpretation mandated reversal of the trial
judge's permit denial.52
It was the issuance of a permit that claimed the supreme court's
attention in McKee v. City of Geneva,5 3 a permit concerning waste
management. The plaintiff sought to mandamus the city's verification
that his proposed waste handling facility was, as required by statute,54
consistent with the municipal solid waste management plan ("SWMP"). 5 Observing that the city's "regional SWMP," adopted in 1993,
did not preclude the facility, the court found the requisite "consistency."5" The court thus rejected the trial court's actions in determining
the SWMP to incorporate by reference a 1995 multi-jurisdictional
comprehensive plan ("CP"): 57 "[Tihe CP was not even in existence when

48. Northside Corp., 275 Ga. App. at 31, 619 S.E.2d at 693. The zoning ordinance,
section 16-28.024, provided that "a location licensed for the retail sale of packaged alcoholic
beverages on or before May 6, 1997 shall not be required to comply with the distance
requirements set forth in subsection (2)(a)-(g) above provided that such location is not
expanded or enlarged." Id. at 32, 619 S.E.2d at 693 (emphasis supplied by the court).
49. Id. at 30, 619 S.E.2d at 692. "The city contends that the location referred to in the
code section is the building itself, which would expand if the proposed addition is allowed."
Id. at 32, 619 S.E.2d at 693.
50. Id. at 32, 619 S.E.2d at 693. "Zoning ordinances must be strictly construed in favor
of the property owner and never extended beyond their plain and explicit terms." Id.
51. Id. The court concluded that "the term 'location' ... refers to the entire site
occupied by the store, not simply to the building on that site." Id., 619 S.E.2d at 694.
52. Id. at 33, 619 S.E.2d at 694.
53. 280 Ga. 411, 627 S.E.2d 555 (2006).
54. O.C.G.A. § 12-8-24(g) (2006). "O.C.G.A. § 12-8-24(g) provides, in relevant part, that
the verification must attest to the proposed facility's compliance 'with the local,
multijurisdictional, or regional [SWMPI developed in accordance with standards
promulgated pursuant to this part subject to the provisions of Code Section 12-8-31.1
....
McKee,." 280 Ga. at 411-12, 627 S.E.2d at 557.
55. McKee, 280 Ga. at 411, 627 S.E.2d at 557. The trial court had denied the plaintiffs
request for the mandamus. Id. On the problems encountered with the remedy of
mandamus in local government law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS
IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1989).
56. McKee, 280 Ga. at 412, 627 S.E.2d at 557. "Thus, the SWMP, as it was approved
in 1993, did not preclude locating a facility for the handling of solid waste in the City,
because no unsuitable locations for such facilities were identified." Id.
57. Id. at 412-14, 627 S.E.2d at 557-58. "By its terms, O.C.G.A. § 12-8-24(g) does not
require compliance with both a SWMP and a CP." Id. at 412, 627 S.E.2d at 557.
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the City contends that it was incorporated by reference into the
SWMP."5 Because "[the plaintiff's] facility would be located on a site
which is not identified as unsuitable in the unamended 1993 SWMP, it
does comply with that plan," and the trial court erred in refusing
mandamus.5 9
The municipality found itself the subject of regulation in City of
Rincon v. Couch,6" as it appealed from a denial of its application to the
State Environmental Protection Division ("EPD") for an additional
groundwater withdrawal permit. Reviewing the proceeding's extensive
background,6 1 and numerous objections to the administrative law
judge's decision, 2 the court of appeals rejected the municipality's
position. Primarily, the city disputed the EPD's consideration of
whether an alternative water source was available-thereby requiring the
city to purchase water from the county at greater expense than it would
incur in drawing water from its own well.64 Even so, the court reasoned, "the EPD is entitled to weigh [the city's] costs against other
public policy concerns that must be taken into account. . ., such as the
need for conservation of limited water resources."65

58. Id. at 412, 627 S.E.2d at 557. Rather incredulously, the court marveled that "[tihe
City does not cite any authority for the proposition that the principle of incorporation by
reference can apply prospectively to a document which has yet to be filed or made a public
record because it is non-existent." Id. at 412-13, 627 S.E.2d at 557.
59. Id. at 415, 627 S.E.2d at 559. Two justices dissented, arguing that the plaintiffs
application was not consistent with controlling standards and that the trial court did not
err in refusing the mandamus. Id. at 415-19, 627 S.E.2d at 559-62 (Benham, J.,
dissenting).
60. 276 Ga. App. 567, 623 S.E.2d 754 (2005).
61. See id. at 567-68, 623 S.E.2d at 756-57. This background included a prior consent
order between the EPD and the municipality which had been enforced and affirmed in City
of Rincon v. Couch, 272 Ga. App. 411, 612 S.E.2d 596 (2005). Couch, 276 Ga. App. at 567,
623 S.E.2d at 757.
62. Couch, 276 Ga. App. at 568-74, 623 S.E.2d 757-61. "The ALJ's decision constituted
the final administrative decision of the Georgia Board of Natural Resources," and was
affirmed by operation of law when the superior court issued no order within 30 days of a
hearing. Id. at 568, 623 S.E.2d at 757.
63. Id. at 567, 623 S.E.2d at 756.
64. Id. at 569-71, 623 S.E.2d at 758-59. The city argued that "'the public interest is
best served by having a safe and low-cost water supply source available to citizens.'" Id.
at 571, 623 S.E.2d at 759.
65. Id. at 572, 623 S.E.2d at 760 (citing O.C.G.A. § 12-5-91 (2006)). The court similarly
denied arguments of due process, equal protection, and an unconstitutional taking. Id. at
574, 623 S.E.2d at 761.
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D. Openness
Because "openness in government" constitutes a concept more heralded
than practiced, most survey periods entertain an instance of litigation
concerning the issue.6 6 Georgia's Open Records Act authorizes an
award of attorney fees and litigation expenses should a party involved
in an action for enforcement act "without substantial justification."6 7
The plaintiff in Everett v.Rast 8 sought to invoke that authorization
regarding his efforts to obtain records on "compensation paid by the City
to acquire certain rights of way during the previous two years."69 As
described by the court of appeals, "[the plaintiff] requested the records;
the City responded that it would comply with the request; and the City
failed to hear from [the plaintiff], who then sued for access."" Reasoning that "it was incumbent on [the plaintiff] to follow up with the City
after the City indicated that it would provide the requested documents,"7 the court affirmed that the plaintiff had "rushed to litigation."72 Consequently, the trial court had validly exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for fees and expenses."
E. Contracts
Typically, municipal contracts must conform to the authority under
which they are made, and unambiguous municipal obligations are
confined by their terms. 4 The court of appeals applied those principles
in Fulton Greens Ltd. Partnershipv. City of Alpharetta" regarding a

66. For perspective on the requirement of openness in local government law, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., The Omen of "Openness"in Local Government Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 97
(1978).
67. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73(b) (2006).
68. 272 Ga. App. 636, 612 S.E.2d 925 (2005).
69. Id. at 636, 612 S.E.2d at 926.
70. Id. at 637, 612 S.E.2d at 926-27.
71. Id., 612 S.E.2d at 927.
72. Id. "Instead, [the plaintiff] immediately sued to obtain the requested documents."
Id.
73. Id. The plaintiff had failed to show that the municipality had "'acted without
substantial justification ... in not complying with [the Act].'" Id. (brackets in original)
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73(b)).
74. See generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Legislative Process in Georgia Local
Government Law, 5 GA. L. REV. 1 (1969); see also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Governments
and Contractsthat Bind, 3 GA. L. REV. 546 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government
Litigation:Some Pivotal Principles, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1 (2003).
75. 272 Ga. App. 459, 612 S.E.2d 491 (2005).
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"Private Development Agreement" between the parties.7" Under that
contract the developer agreed to construct at its cost a road extension in
order to develop its property, and the city agreed to reimburse the
developer by way of impact fee credits.
Holding the agreement to
control the parties' respective obligations, the court denied the developer's statutory claim for monetary reimbursement in excess of usable
impact fee credits. 7s "By its plain terms, the private Development
Agreement entered here obligates the City to compensate [the developer]
for the Windward Parkway extension with impact fee credits that can be
used in several ways. Nothing in the contract permits [the developer]
to seek other reimbursement."79
F

Finances

The survey period presented the court of appeals with issues of
municipal finance in strikingly different contexts. Lines v. City of
Bainbridge° featured a lost-profits claim by successful bidders at a
municipal tax sale, a sale later voided by reason of the city's lack of
notice to lienholders. 81 Rejecting the plaintiffs' position, the court
emphasized undisputed facts that the sale was void and that the city
had returned all payments to the bidders."2 Consequently, "[tihere was
never any 'sale' from which appellants could expect any profits," for the

76. Id. at 460, 612 S.E.2d at 492. The agreement was authorized by the "Georgia
Development Impact Fee Act," O.C.G.A. §§ 36-71-1 to -13 (2006). Fulton Greens, 272 Ga.
App. at 461, 612 S.E.2d at 493.
77. Fulton Greens, 272 Ga. App. at 460, 612 S.E.2d at 492. The court noted:
As expressed in the contract, these credits are to be applied against road impact
fees due for the shopping center development. To the extent the credits exceed
such fees, the contract permits [the developer] to apply the credits against other
development-related fees owed the City or to transfer them to third parties.
Id. at 463, 612 S.E.2d at 494.
78. Id. at 463-64, 612 S.E.2d at 494-95. The plaintiff made its claim under O.C.G.A.
section 36-71-7(b), which the court agreed "generally authorizes developers to seek
monetary reimbursement for excess development fee credits." Id. at 463, 612 S.E.2d at
494. However, the court reasoned, "municipalities and developers may enter into private
agreements that otherwise govern, and potentially alter, the reimbursement or payment
methods for system improvements." Id.
79. Id. at 463, 612 S.E.2d at 494. The court thus affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment for the municipality. Id. at 464, 612 S.E.2d at 495.
80. 273 Ga. App. 420, 615 S.E.2d 235 (2005).
81. Id. at 420-21, 615 S.E.2d at 235-36. The plaintiffs were the successful bidders on
thirty-six properties at the tax sale only to be informed roughly a week later that the sale
had been voided. Id. at 421-22, 615 S.E.2d at 236.
82. Id. at 422, 615 S.E.2d at 236.

2006]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

277

reason that "[t]here can be no 'lost profits' from a sale that was void
from the beginning." 3
A somewhat more convoluted matter confronted the court in Berry v.
City of East Point, 4 an intervenors' appeal from the validation of
revenue bonds for a new sewer facility owned by the building authority
and leased to the municipality.8 5 Rejecting numerous attacks against
the proceeding, 6 the court initially affirmed the trial court's requirement that the intervenors file a surety bond under the "Public Lawsuits
Act."87 As for the alleged creation of an invalid municipal "debt,"8 8 the
court held the city's obligation limited to making lease payments under
the constitutionally anchored "intergovernmental contract." 9 The
arrangement neither created a prohibited "debt" absent voter approval,
nor impermissibly pledged the city's full faith and credit.9 ° Finally, the
court held the building authority's creating statute9' to preempt the
city charter's 15-mill tax limitation:9 2 "To the extent that the [city's tax
power under the building authority statute] conflicts with the earlier
enacted 15-mill limitation on the City's taxing authority, the later-

83. Id. The court summarily rejected the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees: '[Tihere
is no evidence that [the city] engaged in any conduct that would authorize an award of
attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11." Id. The court thus affirmed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment for the municipality. Id., 615 S.E.2d at 237.
84. 277 Ga. App. 649, 627 S.E.2d 391 (2006).
85. Id. at 649, 627 S.E.2d at 394-95. "The sewer project facilities would be owned by
the Building Authority and leased to the City for an amount sufficient to pay the principal
and interest on the bonds. The City would levy ad valorem taxes as necessary to make the
payments required under the lease agreement." Id., 627 S.E.2d at 395.
86. Id. at 650-56, 627 S.E.2d at 395-99. For example, the court rejected the intervenors'
argument that the building authority had not properly registered with the Georgia
Department of Community Affairs under O.C.G.A. section 36-80-16 (2006). Id. at 651-52,
627 S.E.2d at 396. "[T]he Authority demonstrated that it had properly registered before
the bond proposal was validated by the trial court. Therefore, the procedural deficiency, if
any, had been cured before the validation hearing." Id.
87. Id. at 655-56, 627 S.E.2d at 399. "'The Public Lawsuits Act (O.C.G.A. § 50-15-2]
gives courts the authority to require a bond of any party who opposes a public improvement project in a public lawsuit.'" Id. at 650, 627 S.E.2d at 395 (quoting Haney v. Dev.
Auth. of Bremen, 271 Ga. 403, 404-06, 519 S.E.2d 665, 667(1999)). Under that statute, the
court had required the intervenors to post a $625,000 surety bond. Id., 627 S.E.2d at 394.
88. Id. at 652, 627 S.E.2d at 397 (citing GA. CONST. art. IX, § 3, para. 2(a)).
89. Id. at 652-53, 627 S.E.2d at 397 (citing GA. CONST. art. IX, § 3, para. 1(a)).
"Therefore, the City's payment 'for the use of the [sewer project] is a debt, but it is a debt
authorized under the constitution.'" Id. (quoting Clayton County Airport Auth. v. State,
265 Ga. 24, 25, 453 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1995)) (brackets in original).
90. Id. at 653, 627 S.E.2d at 397. "[T]he pledge of the taxing power is permissible, and
the trial court did not err in so ruling." Id.
91. 1983 Ga. Laws 4309.
92. 1972 Ga. Laws 2201.
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enacted provision must govern."9 3 The "[ilntervenors' claim lacked
merit,"9 4 the court declared,
and their failure to post the surety bond
95
doomed their effort.

G. Liability
Issues deriving from asserted municipal liability surfaced in several
settings before the appellate courts over the past year-their resolution
adding incrementally to a vast corpus of jurisprudence.96 Operating as
an historic exception to municipal tort immunity, a statute 9' imposes
liability for injuries resulting from negligently defective streets "'after
actual notice, or after the defect has existed for a sufficient length of
time for notice to be inferred."'95 The plaintiffs in Roquemore v. City
of Forsyth9 9 sought unsuccessfully to invoke this exception for injuries
suffered when struck by a motorist due to an allegedly malfunctioning
streetlight.' ° The court of appeals appraised the record and found it
markedly wanting: "Here," said the court, "there is no evidence that the
city had actual notice of the defect, nor is there any evidence that the
problem with the streetlight had existed for any appreciable length of
time so as to give rise to an issue of constructive notice."'O'

93. Berry, 277 Ga. App. at 654, 627 S.E.2d at 398.
94. Id. at 655, 627 S.E.2d at 399.
95. Id. "Because the trial court properly required the [i]ntervenors to post a surety
bond, and they did not, we dismiss the appeal ...

."

Id.

96. For perspective on that jurisprudence, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal
Government Tort Liability: The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1985); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 405 (1993); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Liability Litigation:Numerical
Nuances, 38 GA. L. REV. 633 (2004).
97. O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) (2006). For treatment of that statute in the appellate courts,
see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILrrY IN GEORGIA 62-116
(4th ed. 1988).
98. Roquemore v. City of Forsyth, 274 Ga. App. 420, 423, 617 S.E.2d 644, 647 (2005)
(quoting Bush v. City of Gainesville, 105 Ga. App. 381, 383, 124 S.E.2d 667, 669 (1962)).
99. 274 Ga. App. 420, 617 S.E.2d 644 (2005).
100. Id. at 420-21, 617 S.E.2d at 645-46. The plaintiffs were struck while crossing the
street at night, and they alleged that a defective streetlight contributed to the accident
because the light was, according to testimony, "'tilt[ed] slightly downward.'" Id. at 421,
617 S.E.2d at 646.
101. Id. at 423, 617 S.E.2d at 647. Accordingly, the city was "relieved of all potential
liability for the malfunctioning streetlight under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a), and the trial court
properly granted its motion for summary judgment." Id. at 424, 617 S.E.2d at 648.
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In concept, governmental immunity is also avoided by a claimant's
establishing the municipality's creation or maintenance of a nuisance.' °2 Effectuating that concept, however, represents a considerable
hurdle for injured claimants-rendering somewhat notable the plaintiffs'
success on the issue in City of Atlanta v. Landmark Environmental
Industries, Inc.'
There, a property owner (and lessee) recovered at
trial for a municipality's nuisance in allowing leaking sewage to invade
the property and, in 1999, to render it unusable. °4 On appeal, the city
challenged the finding of causal knowledge on its part, a challenge
rejected by the court of appeals.0 5 Citing testimony from the city's
public works manager and the plaintiffs' expert geologist, the court
asserted that "as early as the summer of 1998, the City knew that raw
sewage was floating in the ravine across the street from the Property."10 6 Moreover, "in February 1999, the city was persistently contacted about an odor in that area."0l' This evidence, the court concluded,
"authorized the jury to reject the City's position and find that it knew or
should have known that it was maintaining a nuisance."' °
In contrast, the plaintiff enjoyed far less success in Goode v. City of
Atlanta,10 9 a nuisance action for damage to his home following the
rupture of a water main allegedly caused by the city's repair of a sewer
cave-in."
Reviewing the necessary nuisance "factors,"' the court

102. For treatment of nuisance liability in Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 119-34 (4th ed. 1988);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43 MERCER L. REV. 1
(1991); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Liability in Georgia: The "Nuisance"Nuisance, 12
GA. ST. B.J. 11 (1975).
103. 272 Ga. App. 732, 613 S.E.2d 131 (2005).
104. Id. at 732-36, 613 S.E.2d at 134-37. The lessee used the nineteen-acre tract to
receive organic materials for a fee and to mix those materials into a soil amendment which
it sold to various purchasers. Id. at 733, 613 S.E.2d at 135.
105. Id. at 733, 613 S.E.2d at 135. For a municipal nuisance, the court said, the
plaintiff must show conduct exceeding mere negligence, a continuous or repetitious
condition, and a failure to correct after acquiring knowledge of the condition. Id. (citing
City of Bowman v. Gunnells, 243 Ga. 809, 811, 256 S.E.2d 782, 783-84 (1979)).
106. Id. at 736, 613 S.E.2d at 137.
107. Id.
108. Id. The court did hold that the jury verdict for the lessee was flagrantly excessive,
and the court reversed on that point for a retrial. Id. at 740, 613 S.E.2d at 140. The court
also reversed the trial court's decision against the property owner's motion for an award
of attorney fees. Id. at 745-46, 613 S.E.2d at 143. The court concluded that there was
some evidence of the city's "bad faith." Id.
109. 274 Ga. App. 233, 617 S.E.2d 210 (2005).
110. Id. at 233, 617 S.E.2d at 211. The plaintiff alleged that "an excessive amount of
dirt under the foundation of his home was washed away when the main ruptured, and
water and mud flooded his basement." Id.
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initially focused upon the city's repair of the cave-in: "[An isolated act
of negligence cannot form the basis of a nuisance claim."112 Secondly,
the court discounted the alleged "improper tamping" of the fill dirt: "The
one-time repair cannot be deemed continuous or repetitive."113 Finally,
on the necessity of knowledge, "the City had not received any complaints
about flooding in the vicinity of [the plaintiffs] home."" 4 Accordingly,
the court affirmed the city's summary judgment." 5
The "knowledge" factor proved singularly pivotal in Thompson v. City
~
oof a claimed municipal nuisance
of Atlanta,116 a rejection
in designing
and maintaining its drainage system." 7 The plaintiff's car having
hydroplaned on water in the street, she sued for wrongful death and
personal injuries, only to suffer adverse summary judgment in the trial
court."' Making short shrift of the appeal, the court of appeals rested
upon lack of knowledge:" 9 "The city submitted evidence that it had
not received notice of street defects in the area of the intersection, and
the only complaint the city received concerning drainage problems near
the intersection occurred ... nearly three years before the incident
here.' 20
Procedurally, the municipal liability landscape
is littered with the
remains of claims never substantively litigated-claims aborted by the
plaintiffs' noncompliance with the mandate of "ante litem notice."' 2 '

111. Id. at 235-36, 617 S.E.2d at 212. The court extracted those "factors" from the
supreme court's opinion in Gunnells, 243 Ga. 809, 256 S.E.2d 782. Id.
112. Id. at 236, 617 S.E.2d at 212.
113. Id., 617 S.E.2d at 213.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 236-37, 617 S.E.2d at 213. "[T]he trial court concluded as a matter of law,
and we agree, that the undisputed evidence failed to satisfy the above factors." Id. at 236,
617 S.E.2d at 212.
116. 274 Ga. App. 1, 616 S.E.2d 219 (2005).
117. Id. at 1, 616 S.E.2d at 220. The plaintiff sued the municipality in both negligence
and nuisance. Id.
118. Id. at 2, 616 S.E.2d at 220.
119. Id. at 4, 616 S.E.2d at 221. As to negligence, the court held that the evidence
showed no knowledge, as required by O.C.G.A. section 32-4-93(a). Id. at 2-3, 616 S.E.2d
at 221.
120. Id. at 4, 616 S.E.2d at 221. "Knowledge or notice of the alleged defective condition
isan element of this [nuisance] claim as well." Id., 616 S.E.2d at 222.
121. See O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (2006). The statute requires written notice to the
municipality of a claim for damages within six months of the happening of the event. Id.
For treatment of that landscape, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MuNIciPAL TORT
LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 145-74 (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Municipal Tort
Liability: Ante Litem Notice, 4 GA. L. REV. 134 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Ante Litem
Notice: Cause for Pause, URBAN GA. MAG. 24 (Oct. 1978). For a recent analysis of modern
developments, see monograph, R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., ANTE LITEM NOTICE: RECENT
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The court of appeals added to that legacy of frustration via two decisions
during the period under scrutiny. Rabun v. McCoy 122 featured a
building official's action for false termination charges-he asserted
claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and
invasion of privacy.12' Reviewing two letters to city officials by the
plaintiff's attorney, the court declared a failure of notice for any acts
allegedly occurring six months prior to the first letter. 124 As for
alleged defamatory statements within six months of the second
letter, 125 the court focused upon the contents: the letter "contains
nothing that refers to any claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress or false light/invasion of privacy."1 26 Additionally, "there is no
indication in that letter of the person to whom [the official] made these
February statements or the specific content of these statements." 2 7
Accordingly, the court declared all charges of falsehoods "inadequately
noticed to the City,"28 and properly subject to the trial court's dismissal.

1 29

PERSPECTWES (2006).
122. 273 Ga. App. 311, 615 S.E.2d 131 (2005).
123. Id. at 313, 615 S.E.2d at 134. The plaintiff also sued the city manager, both
individually and officially. The plaintiff had been terminated for making alleged willful
and reckless false statements against another official, but was subsequently reinstated by
a special master. Id. at 312-13, 615 S.E.2d at 133-34.
124. Id. at 313-15, 615 S.E.2d at 134-35. The court noted:
In City of Chamblee v. Maxwell, 264 Ga. 635, 636-637, 452 S.E.2d 488, 490 (1994),
the Supreme Court held that, under this statute, claims against municipalities
based upon any event occurring more than six months before written ante litem
notice was given were barred, even if the event was part of a continuing pattern
of events, such as a continuing trespass or nuisance.
Id. at 313, 615 S.E.2d at 134.
125. Id. at 314-15, 615 S.E.2d at 135. The court reasoned that a letter of July 1
referenced defamatory statements allegedly made on or about February 19 and February
27, and "these dates are within the six months of the ... letter." Id.
126. Id. at 315, 615 S.E.2d at 135.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id., 615 S.E.2d at 136. Although the ante litem mandate did not apply to the
plaintiffs action against the city manager in his individual capacity, the court proceeded
to review facts relating to actual malice on his part. Id. at 317-18, 615 S.E.2d at 136-37.
It found that the manager had presented evidence establishing lack of malice and then
examined nine facts employed by plaintiff to carry his resulting burden on the issue. Id.
at 318-19, 615 S.E.2d at 137-38. The court concluded that "[tihe nine 'facts' pointed to by
[the plaintiff] do not rise above the level of conclusory allegations and speculation and do
not suffice to create a jury issue" on actual malice. Id. at 320, 615 S.E.2d 139. Thus, the
court reversed the trial court's summary judgment, adverse to the city manager. Id.
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Claimants also impaled themselves upon the "notice" petard in Davis
v. City of Forsyth,3 ° a "continuing nuisance" action for repeated
sewage overflows onto the plaintiffs' property.'
The court made short
work of a complaint amendment claiming personal injuries: "Significantly, the [prior] letter does not state that [the plaintiffs] seek to recover for
personal injuries. " 132 As for alleged property damages dating "to the
early 1990s," the court again ruled out all harms occurring six months
preceding the notice:13 "The [plaintiffs] cannot recover damages for
any injury to their property that happened prior to six months before
May 9, 2001, the date on which they sent the notice."' 34
Finally, each appellate court confronted an issue off the beaten path
of "municipal liability," a novel issue of distinctive proportions. In
Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency ("GIRMA") v. Godfrey,3 3
the court of appeals construed liability insurance coverage provided by
a unique "statutory association" for municipalities and their employees. 36 Specifically, the court determined whether a police trainee who
used a city police car to participate in a robbery and murder qualified as
an insured "member" under the municipal policy." 7 Analogizing to the

130. 275 Ga. App. 747, 621 S.E.2d 495 (2005).
131. Id. at 747, 621 S.E.2d at 497. The plaintiffs provided notice and filed suit in 2001,
seeking damages for overflows dating back to the early 1990s. They amended their
complaint in 2003 to add a personal injury claim. The trial judge found that the personal
injury claim was barred for lack of notice and ruled that all claims for property damage
occurring prior to six months preceding the notice were barred. Id.
132. Id. at 748, 621 S.E.2d at 498. "A statement that sewage overflows pose a 'health
hazard' does not serve as notice of... a personal injury claim." Id.
133. Id. at 749, 621 S.E.2d at 498. "In City of Chamblee v. Maxwell, [264 Ga. 635, 452
S.E.2d 488 (1994)] our Supreme Court construed this Code section as barring claims
against municipalities based upon any event occurring more than six months before written
ante litem notice was given, even if the event was part of a continuing trespass or
nuisance." Id., 621 S.E.2d at 498-99.
134. Id., 621 S.E.2d at 499. The court also denied the plaintiffs' claim of a "public
nuisance" because it did not injure all members of the public who came in contact with it:
"As there is no evidence that the sewer line at issue injured more than a few individuals
who came into contact with it, it did not constitute a public nuisance." Id. at 750, 621
S.E.2d at 500.
135. 273 Ga. App. 77, 614 S.E.2d 201 (2005).
136. Id. at 78, 614 S.E.2d at 202. "GIRMA is a statutory association formed by
municipalities pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-85-1 et seq." Id. It "provides a mechanism for
municipalities to pool their general liability, motor vehicle liability, and property damage
risks. A municipality that enters a GIRMA coverage agreement in effect purchases liability
insurance." Id.
137. Id. at 80-83, 614 S.E.2d at 204-06. The police trainee had been tried and found
guilty of the robbery and murder, and the victim's family brought a wrongful death action
against the municipality. GIRMA sought summary judgment, contending that it was not
obligated to provide coverage for the claim. Id. at 78, 614 S.E.2d at 202-03. The coverage
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138
test of "respondeat superior" for construing the authorizing statute,
the court reasoned that the trainee "did not commit any of the acts at
issue here on behalf of the City or its police department." 139 Contrarily, the court emphasized, "[the trainee] acted for purely personal
reasons, completely disconnected from the authorized business of his
employer."' 4 ° The municipality exercised no "direction or control" over
the trainee's commission of the acts, and "he certainly was not operating
To claimants'
within the scope of his employment... at that time."'
argument of "apparent authority,' 4 2 the court remained adamant:
"[Riegardless of how the public might have viewed [the trainee's] use of
the police car, he stepped aside from his police employment and
performed acts for entirely personal reasons that led to the robbery and
murder of [the deceased]."' 43 Accordingly, the court concluded, GIRMA
bore no coverage responsibility.'
The supreme court's opportunity for originality arose in Common
Cause/ Georgia v. City of Atlanta,"" an action on behalf of the municipality (and its citizens and taxpayers) seeking damages from a former
Because the mayor had failed to sign a municipal contract
mayor.'
in timely fashion, the plaintiffs alleged, the city unnecessarily paid a
higher rate under an existing contract. 47 Although it had granted

"'
agreement defined "Member" as the City and any [elmployee ... acting for and on behalf
of the [City], and under its direction and control or appointed by the [City] while acting
within the scope of [his] duties as such.'" Id. at 79, 614 S.E.2d at 203 (brackets in
original).
138. Id. at 80-81, 614 S.E.2d at 204. "The statutory [O.C.G.A. §§ 36-85-1 to -20] and
coverage language is similar to that used by our courts in applying the theory of
respondeat superior." Id. at 80, 614 S.E.2d at 204.
139. Id. at 81, 614 S.E.2d at 205.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 82, 614 S.E.2d at 205.
142. Id. "[The... family asserts that a police department employee driving a police
car has the apparent authority of the police department." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 83, 614 S.E.2d at 206. "As a matter of law, [the trainee] was not a 'Member'
under the coverage agreement when he committed the acts giving rise to the ... family's
claims." Id. For perspective on municipal liability insurance in Georgia local government
law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNIcIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 17788 (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Tort Liability Insurance in Georgia Local
Government Law, 24 MERCER L. REV. 651 (1973).
145. 279 Ga. 480, 614 S.E.2d 761 (2005).
146. Id. at 480-81, 614 S.E.2d at 762-63. "Common Cause and [a taxpayer] brought
suit on behalf of the City and its taxpayers seeking a judgment against [the mayor]
individually...." Id. at 481, 614 S.E.2d at 763.
147. Id. at 480-81, 614 S.E.2d at 762-63. The city opened bidding for a five-year
contract to manage parking lots at the municipal airport. The service submitting the low
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certiorari to review dismissal of the action, the supreme court now
provided the claimants cold comfort indeed. 8 First, it denied their
assertion "that a taxpayer citizen of a Georgia municipality has the
power to sue, in the name of that municipality, an officer of the
municipality ..."149 Rather, the court insisted, "[m]unicipal corporations are creatures of the State, . . . and it is for the General Assembly
to specify any such power to sue on the part of taxpayers."5 ° As for
a taxpayer's claim against the mayor in his individual capacity, the court
emphasized the constitution's grant of official immunity for the negligent
performance of a "discretionary duty." 1 ' The relevant city ordinance
"gives the Mayor the choice to sign or not to sign a prepared contract,"" 2 and plaintiffs asserted no "actual malice or actual intent to
cause injury."'5 3 The court affirmed the suit's dismissal."'

bid was already managing airport parking under an existing contract. However, the mayor
failed to sign the resulting contract within the specified time. Id. "In the interim, [the

service] was paid at the higher rate under the existing contract, and received approximately $300,000 more than it would have under the new rate." Id. at 481, 614 S.E.2d at 763.
The plaintiffs sued for the overpayment. Id.
148. Common Cause/Georgia v. Campbell, 268 Ga. App. 599, 602 S.E.2d 333 (2004).
149. Common Cause, 279 Ga. at 481, 614 S.E.2d at 763. The plaintiffs analogized to
a suit by corporate shareholders against a corporate officer in a derivative action. Id.
150. Id. "[T]here is no basis in Georgia law for such an action." Id.
151. Id. at 481-82, 614 S.E.2d at 763 (citing GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(d)). For
treatment of Georgia law on suits against local government officers and employees, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights for Their Wrongs, 13 GA. L.
REV. 747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local Government
Law: The HauntingHiatusof Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
"Official Immunity" in Local Government Law: A Quantifiable Confrontation,22 GA. ST.

U. L. REV. 597 (2006).
152. Common Cause, 279 Ga. at 483, 614 S.E.2d at 764 (emphasis supplied by the
court) (citing ATLANTA, GA., CODE § 2-176 (1977)). 'Accordingly, the failure to execute a

contract is not a violation of a ministerial duty, but rather an act of discretion." Id.
153. Id. at 482, 614 S.E.2d at 763.
154. Id. at 483, 614 S.E.2d at 764. "The motion to dismiss established that the
complaint disclosed that Common Cause would not be able to demonstrate the right to the
requested relief." Id. A dissenting opinion for one justice maintained that under the
reasoning of the court's previous decision in Koehler v. Massell, 229 Ga. 359, 191 S.E.2d

830 (1972), "Common Cause's complaint does set forth a cause of action sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss." Common Cause, 279 Ga. at 484, 614 S.E.2d at 765 (Fletcher,
C.J., dissenting). The dissent observed that "the majority mistakenly limits the rights of
taxpayers to hold public officials accountable for the wrongful expenditure of taxpayer
funds....." Id. at 485, 614 S.E.2d at 766 (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting).
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COUNTIES

A.

Officers and Employees
The supreme court considered two employee status-benefit claims
during the survey period and reached opposing conclusions. In Morgan
County Board of Commissioners v. Mealor,'55 the court sustained the
county's decision "to include the Tax Commissioner within its pension
plan while excluding the Superior Court Clerk." 5 ' That distinction
rested upon the "rational basis" 15 7 that the tax commissioner's state
158
pension plan "is funded without any contribution from the county,"
while the superior court clerk's plan "is funded in part by County fines
and fees." 5 9 Thus, the court concluded, "[tihe County has quite
rationally decided that it should contribute to each constitutional
officer's retirement plan, but that it should only do so once."6 0 Its
action thus "furthers the legitimate governmental purpose of equalizing
the County's pension contributions and fostering financial responsibility
in the funding of its employees' retirement plans."' 6'

155. 280 Ga. 241, 626 S.E.2d 79 (2006).
156. Id. at 244-45, 626 S.E.2d at 83. The superior court clerk sought to mandamus the
county to include her within the county's pension plan. She protested the county's decision
to leave her under the pension plan within the state's retirement system. The trial court
had granted the mandamus. Id. at 242, 626 S.E.2d at 81.
157. Id. at 243, 626 S.E.2d at 82. Equal protection is served, the court reasoned, by a
legislative classification scheme that survives the "rational basis" test. Id.
158. Id. at 244, 626 S.E.2d at 82. "[Tlhe only other retirement plan that the Tax
Commissioner could participate in was funded by her own personal funds and by funds
contributed by the State, but included no funds contributed by the County." Id. at 242, 626
S.E.2d at 81. Thus, the county moved the tax commissioner to the county's own pension
plan. Id.
159. Id. at 244, 626 S.E.2d at 82. The clerk's pension plan "isfunded in part by a
portion of every fine and forfeiture collected by the ... County Superior Court for the
violation of a state law." Id. at 242, 626 S.E.2d at 81. The court rejected the trial judge's
decision that those contributions did not represent county funds because state law
specifically mandated their contribution to the pension plan. Id. at 242-43, 626 S.E.2d at
81.
160. Id. at 244, 626 S.E.2d at 82. "[T]he County's decision to include the Tax
Commissioner within its pension plan, while excluding the other constitutional officers, is
plain and reasonable." Id.
161. Id. The court thus reversed the trial court's issuance of a mandamus requiring
that the clerk be included within the county's pension plan. Id. at 244-45, 626 S.E.2d at
83. For a detailed analysis of the "drastic remedy" of mandamus in local government law,
see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
(1989).

286

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

In contrast, Hill v. Watkins..2 found the court siding with employees
of the county sheriff's office, employees held to be included in the
county's 1994 civil service act. 16 That act drew authorization from a
local constitutional amendment of 1963,164 which a 1986 local statute
had validly continued in effect.1 5 Under the 1994 act, the court held,
"[Ilt is clear that the elected sheriff is not subject to the civil service
system, but those occupying positions in his office are."' 6 Accordingly,
the plaintiff employees deserved injunctive relief against the sheriff's
summary termination of their positions: 167 they could not be dismissed
"'except for good cause and in accordance with civil service system rules
and regulations."""

162. 280 Ga. 278, 627 S.E.2d 3 (2006).
163. Id. at 281, 627 S.E.2d at 6; 1994 Ga. Laws 4399.
164. Hill, 280 Ga. at 280-81, 627 S.E.2d at 6 (citing 1963 Ga. Laws 681 (proposing the
local amendment)).
165. Id. at 279, 627 S.E.2d at 5.
166. Id. According to the court:
[Tlhe 1994 Act states: "Except as provided in this Act, all positions within the
following offices are subject to and covered by the civil service system:... sheriffs"
... The next section expressly excludes from coverage, "elected officials" ....
Viewing these provisions in pari materia as we must, ... it is clear that the
elected sheriff is not subject to the civil service system, but those occupying
positions in his office are.
Id. For analysis of the statutory construction technique of "in pari materia" in Georgia
case law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN GEORGIA: THE
DOCTRINE OF IN PARI MATERIA, reprinted in R.PERRY SENTELL, JR., STUDIES IN GEORGIA
STATUTORY LAw 259 (1997).

167. Hill, 280 Ga. at 278-79, 627 S.E.2d at 4. In 2005 the newly elected sheriff had
summarily terminated twenty-seven employees of the county sheriff's office and advised
them that they were not entitled to the protections of the county's civil service system. Id.
at 278, 627 S.E.2d at 4.
168. Id. at 279, 627 S.E.2d at 5 (quoting 1994 Ga. Laws 4404). A dissenting opinion
for one justice maintained that employees of the sheriff were not county employees and
thus not covered by the county civil service act. Id. at 281, 627 S.E.2d at 6 (Benham, J.,
dissenting).
In Marlowe v. Colquitt County, 278 Ga. App. 184, 628 S.E.2d 622 (2006), the court of
appeals invalidated a "buy out" clause in a county's multi-year employment contract with
its county administrator (a lump-sum payment for early termination without cause) as
inconsistent with the local statute (1986 Ga. Laws 3739) creating the position of county
administrator. Id. at 186, 628 S.E.2d at 624. The local statute required reappointment for
each twelve-month period, the court reasoned, and the employment contract's imposition
of a multi-year obligation violated that requirement. Id. at 185-86, 628 S.E.2d at 623-24.
"The buy-out obligation necessarily restricts the board of commissioners' discretion in
appointing and retaining its county administrator in view of the substantial cost of
severing the County's relationship with [the administrator] before the end of the contract
term." Id. at 186, 628 S.E.2d at 624. The court thus affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment for the county. Id. at 187, 628 S.E.2d at 624.
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The heated context of property tax appraisals generated the defamation action featured in Smith v. Henry. 6 ' There, the chief appraiser
for the county board of tax assessors sued a citizen who attended a
meeting and stated that the plaintiff "'took [her staff's] appraisals and
just arbitrarily raised the value of the land.'" 171 Sketching the parties'
respective burdens in the case, the court of appeals reasoned that "[a]
statement made before a governmental body in connection with an issue
under consideration by that body is privileged."1 71

Here, said the

court, the defendant made a prima facie showing of this "conditional
privilege." 172 In response, the plaintiff must "point to specific evidence
of malice on [the defendant's] part,"173 evidence that the defendant
"either knew his statement was false or made it with reckless disregard
of the truth."1 74 That, "she did not do," her failure prompting the
refusal to grant the defendant's
court's reversal of the trial judge's
175
motion for summary judgment.

B.

Elections
Survey-period litigation illustrated irregularities plaguing local
government elections and neatly delineated the types of defects sufficient
to invalidate the electoral process. In Jones v. Jessup,'17 a contested
election for county sheriff, the supreme court reviewed evidence offered
by the plaintiff to invalidate his thirty-six-vote defeat and deemed it
insufficient "to prove substantial error in the votes cast by 30 of those

169. 276 Ga. App. 831, 625 S.E.2d 93 (2005). For perspective on the issue, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Defamation in Georgia Local Government Law: A BriefHistory, 16 GA. L. REV.
627 (1982).
170. Smith, 276 Ga. App. at 831-32, 625 S.E.2d at 95 (brackets in original). "At the
meeting, county commissioners and citizens discussed recent increases in the dollar value
of property appraisals." Id. at 831, 625 S.E.2d at 95.
171. Id. at 832, 625 S.E.2d at 95.
172. Id. at 832-33, 625 S.E.2d at 95-96. "According to [the defendant's] affidavit, he
based his comments on conversations he had with [the plaintiff] herself and other
employees of the Tax Assessor's office, and he believed his comments were true. This
evidenced good faith." Id. at 833, 625 S.E.2d at 96.
173. Id. at 833, 625 S.E.2d at 96.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 833-34, 625 S.E.2d at 96-97. The court also noted:
The only other evidence cited by [the plaintiff] to show malice is a letter from the
Board of Equalization to the Board of Commissioners written in October 2003,
over a year after the comment at issue here was made .... However, the letter
is hearsay and cannot be considered as evidence.
Id. at 833, 625 S.E.2d at 96-97.
176. 279 Ga. 531, 615 S.E.2d 529 (2005).
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37 witnesses. " 1 77 For example, the court discounted the failure of three
electors to sign an application for an absentee ballot: countering
testimony "established that [those] three electors had voted in person
during the advance voting period and had provided positive identification.... *,,178 Additionally, the court dismissed evidence that several
voters misread the absentee ballot oath, thus failing to include date and
place of birth: their ballots otherwise "substantially complied with all of
the essential requirements of the form ... ,,17' Accordingly, the court
held that the challenger "failed to establish substantial error in the votes
cast by ten of the thirty-seven witnesses he adduced," and the trial court
erred in invalidating the election."s
Similarly, in DeLeGal v. Burch,' the court of appeals rejected a
county citizen's challenge to a special election for the issuance of general
obligation bonds.' 82 The plaintiff posited his objection upon a misstatement appearing in one of the five requisite advertisements183 -a
reference to the bond issuer as the "school district" rather than the
"county.""
Initially designating the proceeding as a "post-election
5
challenge,""' the court denied the "typographical error" to constitute
an "irregularity."'86 Moreover, "even if the clerical error could be

177. Id. at 531-32, 615 S.E.2d at 530. The court stressed the presumption that election
returns are valid, as well as the contestant's burden of showing irregularity sufficient to
place the election results in doubt. Id.
178. Id. at 532, 615 S.E.2d at 531.
179. Id. at 533, 615 S.E.2d at 531.
180. Id. at 533-34, 615 S.E.2d at 531.
181. 273 Ga. App. 825, 616 S.E.2d 485 (2005).
182. Id. at 825-26, 616 S.E.2d at 486-87. The county proposed to issue the bonds to
fund hospital construction, and the voters had approved the bond issue. Id. at 826, 616
S.E.2d at 487.
183. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-45.1 (2003).
184. DeLeGal, 273 Ga. App. at 827, 616 S.E.2d at 488. "The rest of the notice, which
exceeded eight paragraphs, referred to the bond issuer as . .. 'the County.'" Id.
185. Id. at 828, 616 S.E.2d at 488. This designation operated to reject the plaintiff's
argument that "in a challenge brought prior to an election, the failure to comply with any
provision of the election law will invalidate the election, regardless of whether the failure
placed the election result in doubt." Id. The court stated that "by [the plaintiffs] failure
to preserve or pursue his injunctive remedies, [he] elected to pursue only a post-election
challenge." Id.
186. Id. at 828-29, 616 S.E.2d at 488-89. "The notice was also timely because it
informed the voters of everything the law required within the requisite 30-day period. We
agree with the superior court's legal conclusion that notice was sufficient under O.C.G.A.
§§ 21-2-45.1(a) and 36-82-1(b)." Id.
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considered an 'irregularity' in the election process, it would not, as a
matter of law, warrant setting aside the election."187
The supreme court drew the line in Burton-Callawayv. CarrollCounty
58
Board of Elections'
by invalidating a school-board referendum
mandated by local legislation, which stated that it would "'provide for
the continuation in office of current members."' 8 9 "In fact," the court
declared, the bill "would shorten the term of some of those members by
two years."9 0 This misrepresentation, the court concluded, violated
the state's statutory prohibition on abolishing or changing a term of
office by local statute unless approved "'by the people of the jurisdiction
affected in a referendum on the question.'"' 9' Here, the language on
the referendum ballot "made no mention of its effect on the terms of
current board members," 92 and could not withstand the challenge of
a member whose term it thus shortened.' 93 Accordingly, the court
forcefully reversed the trial judge's approval of the referendum.9 4
C. Powers
The court of appeals turned a deaf ear to complaints leveled against
the county's power to provide for water service. In Lancaster v.
Effingham County, 95 taxpayers challenged procedures via which the
county constructed a water treatment facility for its unincorporated
areas. Upholding the purchase of 500 acres of land (rather that the 200

187. Id. at 829, 616 S.E.2d at 489. "It has long been the law that an irregularity in an
election notice provides no basis to contest the election results unless the contestant
presents evidence showing that the irregularity is 'sufficient to change or place in doubt
the result.'" Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 21-2-522(3) (2003)).
188. 279 Ga. 590, 619 S.E.2d 634 (2005).
189. Id. at 590-91, 619 S.E.2d at 634. "The local bill, as well as the 'Notice of Intention
to Introduce Local Legislation,' which was published in the County's legal organ, stated
that it would 'provide for the continuation in office of current members.'" Id. at 591, 619
S.E.2d at 635 (quoting 2004 Ga. Laws 3592).
190. Id. at 592, 619 S.E.2d at 635.
191. Id. at 591, 619 S.E.2d at 634 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 1-3-11 (2000)). "In order for the
people of the jurisdiction to properly alter a duly elected local official's term, they must be
informed of how their vote would affect such a change." Id., 619 S.E.2d at 635.
192. Id. at 591, 619 S.E.2d at 635. "Voters were never informed, therefore, that their
approval of the referendum would shorten [the plaintiffs] term of office by two years." Id.
193. Id. at 592, 619 S.E.2d at 635. The court noted:
If the law requires that a referendum be held before a certain action may occur,
then certainly, to be valid, the referendum must accurately inform voters of its
effect with respect to that action. Otherwise, it cannot be said that the
referendum even qualified as a "referendum on the question."
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 1-3-11).
194.
195.

Id.
273 Ga. App. 544, 615 S.E.2d 777 (2005).
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acres actually needed), 96 the court relied upon the county's "broad
discretion" in acquiring property.'9 7 "[U]ndisputed evidence," the court
insisted, revealed the county's "good-faith" efforts.'9" Likewise, the
court approved the board's notice of a meeting to amend the annual
budget, although that notice omitted the matter of borrowing from the
general reserve fund. 99 The court simply found "no evidence" of a
"purpose of deceiving the public.""'
Although the fund contained
monies from all areas of the county, "the ultimate cost of the land used
2°
... would not [in violation of the Service Delivery Act] ' be borne by
2
the residents of incorporated areas."" Rather, the board ultimately
replenished the reserve fund by selling the surplus land,2"' and the
court deemed "[the taxpayers' contention that this fiscally responsible
outcome somehow damaged them [to be] without merit."0 4
The state's "Service Delivery Act"2" 5 likewise featured prominently
in Alcovy Shores Water & Sewerage Authority v. Jasper County.2"6
There, an existing local water authority. 7 challenged the "Service
Delivery Agreement" crafted by a county and two municipalities which
empowered the county water authority to operate within the plaintiff's

196. Id. at 545, 615 S.E.2d at 779. The county explained that the seller did not wish
to subdivide the land and that the board considered the purchase in the county's best
interest. Id. at 544, 615 S.E.2d at 778.
197. Id. at 545, 615 S.E.2d at 779. The court relied upon GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para.
3(a)(7) and O.C.G.A. § 36-82-61, -62 (2005). Id.
198. Id. The county had subsequently sold the surplus land involved in the
transaction, and the court noted that the taxpayers had "presented no evidence that the
Board purchased the property in an attempt to benefit either the seller of the 500-acre
parcel or the buyer of the 287-acre surplus." Id.
199. Id. at 546, 615 S.E.2d at 779. "Here, the Board gave proper notice of the meeting
to amend the 2003 budget in accordance with the Open Meetings Act." Id.
200. Id. "This omission, moreover, did not preclude the Board from discussing this
issue and acting upon it at the meeting." Id.
201. O.C.G.A. § 36-70-24(3)(A) (2006).
202. Lancaster, 273 Ga. App. at 546, 615 S.E.2d at 780.
203. Id. "Ultimately, the county was able to obtain over 200 acres of land for a water
treatment plant at virtually no cost." Id.
204. Id. As for the plaintiffs' complaint that the county had improperly rezoned the
surplus land which it sold, the court asserted that 'none of the taxpayers in this case lived
adjacent to or would be uniquely affected by the rezoned 287 acres. Thus the taxpayers
do not have standing to challenge zoning decisions made with respect to the property." Id.
at 547, 615 S.E.2d at 780.
205. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-70-20 to -28 (2006).
206. 277 Ga. App. 341, 626 S.E.2d 560 (2006).
207. Id. at 341, 626 S.E.2d at 561. The plaintiffs authority had been created by a 1979
local statute. Id.; see 1979 Ga. Laws 3177.
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"project area."2 °8 Rejecting the challenge, the court denied the
agreement to alter the plaintiff's "project area."" 9 Rather, the agreement only prohibited the use of governmental funds for the plaintiff's
operations outside its "service area."210 Accordingly, the defendants
"acted in conformity with the [Service Delivery] Act in designating [the
plaintiff's] service area and were not required to designate a service area
2
. . which was the same as [the plaintiff's] project area." '
The supreme court considered an issue of county power in R. D. Brown
Contractors, Inc. v. Board of Education of Columbia County,2 12 more
specifically the county school board's power to waive a requirement
contained in its invitation for school construction bids.2 13 Focusing
upon a statutory mandate that the bid only conform "in all material
respects" to the invitation,214 the court held the board empowered to
waive its requirement that the bid contain a list of subcontractors. 215
"We see no reason why the Board could not determine that it was not a
material requirement, but rather a technicality that could be
waived."216 The board's actions enabled it to accept the low bid, the
*

208. Alcovy Shores, 277 Ga. App. at 341-42, 626 S.E.2d at 561-62. The agreement
established the service area for the county water authority, which included a portion of the
plaintiffs service area. Id.
209. Id. at 343, 626 S.E.2d at 563.
210. Id., 626 S.E.2d at 562-63. "The salient point, however, is that the Service
Agreement and the Act do not alter [the plaintiffs] project area as defined in its creating
legislation." Id., 626 S.E.2d at 563.
211. Id. at 344, 626 S.E.2d at 563. The plaintiff also argued that the trial court failed
to consider that although it was not a party to the service agreement, it could not get
funding or a permit to operate in its remaining territory. Id. at 345, 626 S.E.2d at 564.
Said the court: "[The plaintiff] was not a party to the Service Agreement because it was
not a county or municipality directed by the Act to enter into an agreement setting forth
a service delivery strategy." Id. The court thus affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment for the defendants. Id. at 346, 626 S.E.2d at 564.
212. 280 Ga. 210, 626 S.E.2d 471 (2006).
213. Id. at 210-11, 626 S.E.2d at 473. The school board's invitation for bids required
that each bid include a list of major subcontractors, a step neglected by what turned out
to be the low bidder. Although initially rejected by the bid administrator, the bidder
provided the list later in the day and, at a subsequent meeting, the school board accepted
the bid. The losing bidder requested the trial court to enjoin the board's actions, only to
suffer the court's rejection. Id.
214. Id. at 212-13, 626 S.E.2d at 474 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-91-2(12) (2006)).
215. Id. at 213, 626 S.E.2d at 475. The plaintiff pointed "to no statute, regulation, or
ordinance that requires that subcontractors be listed on bids; the only place such a
provision appears is on the invitation for bids produced by the Board." Id.
216. Id. at 214, 626 S.E.2d at 475. "The trial court did not err in concluding that the
bid provision of a list of subcontractors was immaterial and could be waived." Id. at 213,
626 S.E.2d at 475.
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court emphasized, and "produced the lowest possible responsible
price. 11217
D.

Regulation

The county's regulatory power, typically a high-profile issue for local
government litigation, perpetuated its propensity during the survey
period.2 18 In 105 Floyd Road, Inc. v. Crisp County,2 1 9 the supreme
court elaborated a "vagueness analysis". to conclude that a county's
development code 22 -- defining sexually-oriented adult use according
to an establishment's "substantial business purpose"22 1-violated due
process.222 The court reasoned that the definition "does not look to
stock in trade, gross sales, floor space or some other readily quantifiable
standard," but "rather looks solely to the 'purpose' of the business."223
It provided no "guidelines for those establishments seeking to operate
within the County to enable them to determine what amount of 'purpose'
qualifies as 'substantial.'" 224
Finally, "the ordinance provides no
guidelines to enable a reasonable person to determine at what point the
offering of sexually-explicit material to the public becomes a substantial
purpose of its business."225

217. Id. at 213, 626 S.E.2d at 475. "The trial court correctly found that it was unlikely
that [the plaintiff] would prevail on the merits, and did not abuse its discretion in denying
the interlocutory injunction." Id.
218. For perspective on county regulatory power, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "Ascertainable Standards" versus "UnbridledDiscretion" in Local Government Regulation, 41 GA.
COUNTY GoV. MAG. 19 (Dec. 1989); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion in Georgia Local
Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 614 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law
and Liquor Licensing: A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REV. 1039 (1981); R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit in Georgia Local Government Law, 9 GA.
L. REV. 115 (1974).
219. 279 Ga. 345, 613 S.E.2d 632 (2005).
220. CRISP COUNTY, GA., UNIFIED LAND DEV. CODE § 3.01.02 (2001). The county
argued that the defendant's business would qualify under its code as a sexually-oriented
business and challenged its operation without a special use permit. 105 Floyd Road, 279
Ga. at 345, 613 S.E.2d at 632-33.
221. 105 Floyd Road, 279 Ga. at 345, 613 S.E.2d at 632. The code defined a covered
business as "[a]ny establishment that, as a regular and substantial business, offers
services, . . . or materials" coming within the code's definition. Id.
222. Id. at 350, 613 S.E.2d at 636.
223. Id. at 348, 613 S.E.2d at 635. To make that determination, "the County in reality
focuses . . . on the nature of the other, non-sexually-explicit materials offered by the
establishment to determine whether it qualifies as a sexually-oriented adult use." Id. at
349, 613 S.E.2d at 635.
224. Id. at 348, 613 S.E.2d at 635.
225. Id. at 349, 613 S.E.2d at 635 (emphasis supplied by the court). "Reasonable
persons are left to guess at the meaning of this language and differ as to its application."
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The "drastic remedy" of mandamus constitutes a popular effort at
overcoming county regulatory schemes; the survey period accurately
captured the supreme court's pervading reluctance to embrace those
efforts. 226 An apt example, Screven County Planning Commission v.
Southern States Plantation,LLLP,227 featured an action to mandamus
county approval of a developer's subdivision "sketch plan."228 The
county's refusal rested upon its land development regulations, which it
interpreted to require the developer's paving of existing county roads
abutting the subdivision.2 29 Although the supreme court affirmed the
trial judge's refusal to require the paving, the court balked at the lower
court's issuance of a mandamus.23 °
County regulations granted
discretion to determine the adequacy of existing roads, asserted the
court, and "because the Planning Commission has not exercised that
discretion, the trial court erred 2in
ruling that [the plaintiff] was entitled
1
to approval of its sketch plan."
The court's reluctance likewise manifested itself in litigation over
landfills. In Jackson County v. Earth Resources, Inc.,232 the court

Id. Reversing the trial court's injunction, the supreme court declared that "[tihe challenged
definition is too vague to be enforced and is, therefore, unconstitutional under the due
process clauses of the Georgia and United States constitutions." Id. at 350, 613 S.E.2d at
636. Later in the year, in 105 Floyd Road, Inc. v. Crisp County, 279 Ga. 825, 620 S.E.2d
826 (2005), the supreme court returned to the scene to declare that the store and manager
could not be held in contempt for violating the trial court's injunction, which had been
granted while the defendants' appeal to the supreme court was pending. Id. at 825, 620
S.E.2d at 826. 'It is well established that 'an unconstitutional statute, though having the
form and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and in legal contemplation
is as inoperative as if it had never been passed.'" Id. (quoting Fulton County Comm'rs v.
Davis, 213 Ga. 792, 794, 102 S.E.2d 180, 183 (1958)).
226. For extensive treatment of the phenomenon of mandamus, see R. PERRY SENTELL,
JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1989).
227. 279 Ga. 404, 614 S.E.2d 85 (2005).

228. Id. at 404, 614 S.E.2d at 86. The plan called for developing thirty-two lots, some
of which would access the subdivision through two existing unpaved county roads. Id.

229. Id. at 404-05, 614 S.E.2d at 86. The county planning commission "stated that it
interpreted Section 6.1 to require the paving of the county roads, and it specifically denied

the sketch plan based on that interpretation." Id.
230. Id. at 406-07, 614 S.E.2d at 87. "The key issue is whether the word 'streets' in
Section 6.1 refers only to interior streets of a subdivision that will be constructed as part
of the subdivision or also refers to existing public roads that abut a proposed subdivision."
Id. at 405, 614 S.E.2d at 86. The court concluded that the regulation "is at least
ambiguous concerning whether it requires the paving of existing, unpaved county roads
that abut a proposed subdivision." Id. at 406, 614 S.E.2d at 87.
231. Id. at 407, 614 S.E.2d at 87. The planning commission had based its denial on the
paving issue, said the court, and had not considered the regulation's granted discretion to
determine road adequacy. Id. at 406-07, 614 S.E.2d at 87.
232. 280 Ga. 389, 627 S.E.2d 569 (2006).
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reversed the trial judge's mandamus of a conditional use permit for a
construction and demolition landfill. 233 Reviewing the two public
hearings on the matter, as well as the county's zoning ordinance,3 4 the
court held the latter to leave the board with discretion in making its
decision.235 Inquiring as to the existence of "any evidence" to support
that decision,238 the court noted "very specific concerns" over truck
traffic to the site, inconsistency with the comprehensive use plan, and
groundwater contamination.2 3 7 The evidence clearly indicated that the
county board
had committed no "gross abuse" of its discretion in denying
23
the permit.

The court reached a similar decision in Murray County v.R & J
Murray, LLC, 239 here involving the county's issuance of a verification

to the state EPD for plaintiff's solid waste landfill.24 ° Once again
reversing the trial court,241 and overruling a prior decision by the court
of appeals,242 the supreme court focused upon the material statutes.2 43 Under those statutes, the court held, the county was not

233. Id. at.391, 627 S.E.2d at 572.
234.

JACKSON COUNTY, GA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 13.60 (2004).

235. Earth Resources, 280 Ga. at 390, 627 S.E.2d at 571. The ordinance "sets forth
guidelines to follow and minimum requirements to meet, but clearly leaves the Board with
discretion." Id. Thus, mandamus would be proper "only if the denial of the permit was a
gross abuse of discretion." Id.
236. Id. at 391, 627 S.E.2d at 571 (quoting Fulton County v. Congregation of Anshei
Chesed, 275 Ga. 856, 859, 572 S.E.2d 530, 532 (2002)). The court stressed the test to be
whether there was any evidence to support the county board, not the decision of the trial
court. Id. Further, "it is not the law that only expert opinions could be presented to, and
considered by, the Board, nor is the superior court to weigh the evidence before it; the
question is whether there was any evidence before the Board to support its decision." Id.
237. Id., 627 S.E.2d at 571-72.
238. Id., 627 S.E.2d at 572. "As the record supported the Board's decision to deny the
special use permit, the superior court erred in ordering that the Board issue it." Id.
239. 280 Ga. 314, 627 S.E.2d 574 (2006).
240. Id. at 314, 627 S.E.2d at 575. The verification was required by O.C.G.A. section
12-8-24 (2006). Id., 627 S.E.2d at 575-76.
241. Id., 627 S.E.2d at 576. The trial court held the county had abused its discretion
in the matter and granted a writ of mandamus that the county issue the verification. Id.
at 315, 627 S.E.2d at 576.
242. Id. at 315, 627 S.E.2d at 576 (discussing Butts County v. Pine Ridge Recycling,
Inc., 213 Ga. App. 510, 445 S.E.2d 294 (1994), overruled by Murray County, 280 Ga. 314,
627 S.E.2d 574). In Butts County, the court of appeals held that the county could only
consider environmental and land use factors in determining whether to issue a verification.
213 Ga. App. at 512, 445 S.E.2d at 296. The court in Murray County expressly noted: "we
hereby overrule the decision in Butts County." Murray County, 280 Ga. at 315, 627 S.E.2d
at 576.
243. Murray County, 280 Ga. at 316-17 n.13, 627 S.E.2d at 577-78 n.13 (noting
O.C.G.A. § 12-8-31 (2006), as well as rules promulgated by the Department of Community
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restricted to environmental and land use factors in determining a
proposal's consistency with its solid waste management plan ("SWMP"). 2"

Accordingly, the county had not erred in considering geo-

graphic proximity to its existing landfill nor economic factors in denying
the plaintiff's proposal.24 Indeed, the court concluded, "we find that
a local government is authorized to consider any relevant factor in
determining whether a proposed facility is consistent with its SWMP ...

"246

E. Openness
The "openness in government" issue arose in rather odd guise during
the survey period-at the behest of the government's own employee.247
In Wallace v. Greene County,2' a terminated county employee claimed
attorney fees under the Open Records Act 249 regarding a request for

his personnel file. Although the defendants had failed to answer the
request (until litigation),25 ° they urged that the plaintiff had shown no
violation of the Act: he had shown neither a follow-up to his request nor
his being denied the right of inspection. Rejecting that construction of
the statute,2 5' the court of appeals reasoned that "the person or agency
having custody of the records" must "affirmatively respond to an open
records request within three business days ....252

Although the

plaintiff had sufficiently shown violation,253 the court nevertheless

Affairs ("DCA"), GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 110-4-3.01(2)(c)).
244. Murray County, 280 Ga. at 317-18, 627 S.E.2d at 578. "The regulations issued by
the DCA ...make clear that a local government is not limited in its SWMP to consideration of environmental and land use factors." Id. at 317, 627 S.E.2d at 577. "Thus, in
determining whether a proposed facility is consistent with its SWMP, a local government
is authorized to consider any relevant factor that it appropriately considered in the SWMP
itself." Id., 627 S.E.2d at 578.
245. Id. at 317, 627 S.E.2d at 578.
246. Id. at 315, 627 S.E.2d at 576-77. The court thus reversed the trial court's
mandamus. Id. at 318, 627 S.E.2d at 578.
247. For perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Omen of "Openness" in Local
Government Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 97 (1978).
248. 274 Ga. App. 776, 618 S.E.2d 642 (2005).
249. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73(b) (2005).
250. Wallace, 274 Ga. App. at 777-78, 618 S.E.2d at 645. Shortly after the plaintiff
filed his lawsuit, the county manager mailed a copy of the plaintiffs entire personnel file
to his counsel. The plaintiff sued both the manager and the county. Id.
251. See O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70(f), -72(h) (2006). "Construed together, these provisions
require an affirmative response to an open records request within three business days."
Wallace, 274 Ga. App. at 783, 618 S.E.2d at 648.
252. Wallace, 274 Ga. App. at 783, 618 S.E.2d at 649.
253. Id. at 784, 618 S.E.2d at 649. The court asserted that the Act "was violated when
neither [the county manager] nor anyone else on behalf of the County responded in any
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remanded the case in order to resolve the "second prong" issue; that is,4
25
whether defendants' noncompliance was "substantially justified."
Only with the determination of that issue, the court held, could the
plaintiff's claim for attorney fees be decided.255
F

Contracts
Of the survey period's two contractual claims against counties, neither
comprised an ordinary contract action. A jury's verdict in quantum
meruit attracted the court of appeals's review in Brown v. Penland
Construction Co.,256 the plaintiff's effort to recover from the county
school district, school board, and former coach for construction of an
indoor baseball facility.257 Because quantum meruit "is another name
for an implied contract,"258 and because no written contract existed
between the parties, the court rejected the trial verdict's theory as
precluded by the statutory mandate that county contracts "shall be in
writing and entered on its minutes."259 However, the court countered,

it could sustain the verdict "for another reason,"260 a reason inhering
in the constitutional precept of eminent domain.2"' That precept, an

manner to the open records request made by [the plaintiffs] counsel within the required
three-day period." Id.
254. Id. The court noted that "it is unclear from the record if the trial court considered
whether the appellees 'acted without substantial justification ... in not complying with
[the ORA]' or whether 'special circumstances exist[ed]' that counseled against awarding
fees." Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73(b) (2006)).
255. Id.
256. 276 Ga. App. 522, 623 S.E.2d 717 (2005), cert. granted.
257. Id. at 522-23, 623 S.E.2d at 718. The plaintiff construction company had dealt
primarily with the former coach in erecting the facility. The project was approved by the
school board, but upon its completion, the board refused to pay for the building. The jury
had returned a verdict against the coach, the board, and the district in the amount of
$150,000. Id.
258. Id. at 524, 623 S.E.2d at 719.
259. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-10-1 (2006)). For analysis of the statute, its history and
application by the courts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., County Contracts in Georgia: 'Written
and Entered," 32 MERCER L. REV. 283 (1980). Said the court in Brown: "To be enforceable,
therefore, a contract with a county or subdivision of the county must comply with those
requirements.... As a result, 'quantum meruit is not available when a county is the defendant.'" 276 Ga. App. at 524, 623 S.E.2d at 719 (quoting Cherokee County v. Hause, 229
Ga. App. 578, 579, 494 S.E.2d 234, 235 (1997)).
260. Brown, 276 Ga. App. at 524, 623 S.E.2d at 719.
261. Id. at 524-25, 623 S.E.2d at 719-20. "Basic principles of constitutional law require
that when property is taken by any governmental entity, including a county (or a
subdivision or agency thereof), fair and adequate compensation must be paid to the owner
of the property." Id. at 524, 623 S.E.2d at 719 (citing GA. CONST. art. I, § 3, para. 1(a)).

2006]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

297

express exception to governmental immunity,262 found perfect application to the case: "Because the school district refused to pay for the
building it is using for public purposes, its conduct is a 'taking' for
constitutional purposes.""6 Rejecting requests that both the school board
and the former coach be excluded
from coverage," the court affirmed
65
the jury's verdict of liability.
Donnalley v. Sterling26 6 featured a third-party beneficiary claim
against a coach and school district for a player's drowning at football
camp.267 Seeking to avert the difficulties of tort immunity,26 the
plaintiffs relied upon a rental contract the coach signed to use the
camp.26 9 Reviewing their charge of a breached commitment to provide
qualified supervisory personnel,2 70 the court sketched the plaintiffs'
prerequisite for standing: "'The contracting parties' intention to benefit
the third party must be shown on the face of the contract."'27 ' Here,

262. Id. at 524-25, 623 S.E.2d at 720. "[1f the owner of property taken for a public
purpose brings suit to enforce the constitutional right to just compensation, sovereign
immunity is not a bar." Id. at 525, 623 S.E.2d at 720.
263. Id. at 525, 623 S.E.2d at 720.
264. Id. at 525-26, 623 S.E.2d at 720-21. As for the board, "it is the named grantee on
the deed to the property" and "has held itself out as a legal entity." Id. at 526, 623 S.E.2d
at 720. The coach had "benefitted [sic] economically" from baseball camps held in the
facility, and it had "greatly enhanced his reputation." Id., 623 S.E.2d at 721.
265. Id. at 527, 623 S.E.2d at 721. "[W]e cannot conclude that the jury's verdict of
$150,000 was so excessive that it warrants reversal." Id.
266. 274 Ga. App. 683, 618 S.E.2d 639 (2005).
267. Id. at 683, 618 S.E.2d at 639-40. The plaintiffs' son drowned on the first day of
a three-day football training camp while the players were riding a "zip line" into the lake.
The players were supervised by an assistant football coach who was certified to teach first
aid but held no certificate in water rescue. After dropping from the line into the lake, the
plaintiffs' son began to struggle. Even though other players and coaches attempted to
assist the boy, he was not breathing when he was finally pulled from the water. Id. at 68384, 618 S.E.2d at 639-40.
268. Id. at 683, 618 S.E.2d at 640. The trial court found that the school district and
the coach were shielded from tort liability on the grounds of sovereign and official
immunity. Id.
269. Id. at 684, 618 S.E.2d at 640. The defendant coach had signed a one-page rental
contract with the YMCA for the use of the Athens "Y" Camp, agreeing that the football
team, not the YMCA, was responsible for providing qualified personnel to supervise the
lake during water activities. Id.
270. Id. The plaintiffs argued that their son was a third-party beneficiary of the rental
contract, which the defendants had breached by failing to provide qualified personnel at
the lake. The trial court had denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
contract claim. Id. at 684-85, 618 S.E.2d at 640.
271. Id. at 685, 618 S.E.2d at 641 (quoting Brown v. All-Tech Inv. Group, 265 Ga. App.
889, 897, 595 S.E.2d 517, 524 (2004)). It was not enough, said the court, that the party
would benefit from the performance of the agreement. Id. at 686, 618 S.E.2d at 641.
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the court distinguished, "[i]t is clear that the contract, when read as a
whole, was intended to delineate the relative duties and responsibilities
of the parties."2 72 Any benefit to the plaintiffs' decedent "was merely
incidental and did not render him a third-party beneficiary to the
contract."2 73 Minus the "intent to confer a direct benefit upon the
individual players,"2 74 the defendants enjoyed
"summary judgment on
27 5
the [the plaintiffs'] breach of contract claim."
G.

Taxation

County taxation claimed the attention of both appellate courts during
the period, on issues highly diverse in context. Community Renewal &
Redemption, LLC v. Nix 27 6 featured uncertainty over when a county's
277
interest in property, acquired at a tax sale, ripened into fee simple.
All agreed that until a 1989 statute required adverse possession, the
county's title had vested simply by the passage of time. 2 7 s Disagreement arose over whether the modifying statute took effect upon its
passage or only when the court later recognized the change.2 7 ' A

272. Id. at 686, 618 S.E.2d at 641. The court observed that the intent of the contract
was
merely to clarify that it was the football team, and not the camp, that had the
responsibility over the lake area and its associated activities and specifically to
relieve Athens "Y" Camp of this responsibility. While the members of the football
team may have incidentally benefitted [sic] from this agreement, we find nothing
in the language indicating an intent to confer a direct benefit upon the individual
players to protect them from physical harm.
Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id., 618 S.E.2d at 642. The court thus reversed the trial court's refusal to grant
the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the third-party contract claim. Id.
276. 279 Ga. 840, 621 S.E.2d 722 (2005).
277. Id. at 840, 621 S.E.2d at 722-23. At a tax sale in 1993, the county took a tax deed
on the property and held it until selling it to the defendant in 1999. The former owner sold
the property to the plaintiff in 2003, and the plaintiff sought to force redemption against
the county's purchaser. Id.
278. Id. at 842, 621 S.E.2d at 723. The former rule existed by virtue of O.C.G.A.
section 48-4-48 (1999), which was amended in 1989 to make "clear that for all tax deeds
executed after July 1, 1989, the ripening of title must occur by prescription, not by the
mere passage of time." Id. at 841, 621 S.E.2d at 723; see 1949 Ga. Laws 1132-33.
279. Community Renewal, 279 Ga. at 841, 621 S.E.2d at 723. The court had tendered
that recognition by virtue of its decision in Blizzard v. Moniz, 271 Ga. 50, 518 S.E.2d 407
(1999): "[Tlhe plain language of O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48 [1999 & Supp. 2006)] requires ...
adverse possession by the tax deed grantee in order for title to ripen under the statute."
Community Renewal, 279 Ga. at 841, 621 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting Blizzard, 271 Ga. at 54,
518 S.E.2d at 410-11). Here, the trial court held that the amendment to the statute did
not change the existing rule until the court's decision in Blizzard in 1999. Id. Therefore,
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unanimous supreme court afforded the issue summary disposition: "The
requirement for adverse possession ... became effective in 1989 when
the amendment to the statute became effective, not when [the court]
recognized the change in 1999. " 28' Accordingly, the court reversed the
trial judge's decision for the county's purchaser.28 '
In Pope v. Board of Commissioners of Fulton County,282 the court of
appeals reviewed the county's removal of tax assessors for failing to
complete the tax digest in a timely manner. 28" Emphasizing the
commissioners' "wide latitude" in determining cause for removal, 8 4 the
court searched the record for "any evidence" supporting their decision.285 It promptly found that evidence in a letter the petitioners had
submitted for their hearing: that letter "contained at least tacit
admissions that Petitioners did not complete their revisions and
assessments by the statutory deadline."28
Accordingly, "[t]hese
implicit acknowledgments constitute 'some evidence' that Petitioners
failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 48-5-302 and therefore establish cause
for their removal."287

the court rendered summary judgment for the county's grantee, thereby denying the
plaintiffs power of redemption. Id. at 840, 621 S.E.2d at 723.
280. Id. at 841, 621 S.E.2d at 723. The court cited Smith v. State, 218 Ga. App. 429,
461 S.E.2d 553 (1995), "recognizing that subsequent statutory amendment supersedes an
appellate court's statutory construction." Id. at 841-42, 621 S.E.2d at 723.
281. Id. at 842, 621 S.E.2d at 724. 'Since the tax deed in this case was executed after
July 1, 1989, the pre-1989 provision.. . was no longer in effect, and the trial court erred
in ruling that title had vested in [the] County by virtue of the passage of time." Id., 621
S.E.2d at 723.
282. 276 Ga. App. 121, 622 S.E.2d 471 (2005).
283. Id. at 121, 622 S.E.2d at 472. O.C.G.A. section 48-5-302 (1999 & Supp. 2006)
requires tax assessors to complete their county tax digests by July 1, or June 1 if taxes are
paid in installments. The commissioners had notified petitioners of the charges, and had
afforded them an opportunity to respond prior to a hearing. The petitioners had submitted
a letter to the commissioners denying the charges and had attended the hearing. Id. at
121-24, 622 S.E.2d at 472-74.
284. Id. at 123-24, 622 S.E.2d at 474. As long as no "abuse of such discretion" was
shown, said the court, it should not substitute its findings for those of the appointing
authority. Id.
285. Id. at 124, 622 S.E.2d at 474. "We will uphold the decision if there is any evidence
to support it." Id.
286. Id. "[T]he letter stated, among other things, that it was 'impossible' to comply
with O.C.G.A. § 48-5-302 and that no county.., had done so since 1988. These sweeping
avowals could not coexist with a claim that Petitioners had met the deadline." Id. at 125,
622 S.E.2d at 475.
287. Id. at 125, 622 S.E.2d at 475. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's decision
upholding the removal. Id. at 126, 622 S.E.2d at 475.
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Finally, Greene County Board of Tax Commissioners v. Higdon..
presented a taxpayers' challenge to the county's creation of a special tax
district consisting of all real property in the county, and extracting an
assessment from each land parcel to fund revenue bonds for hospital
services. 2"9 Receptive to that challenge, the trial court distinguished
an "assessment" from a "tax," finding that the former must provide a
benefit to each landowner, and invalidated the assessments.2 90 On the
county's appeal, the court of appeals declared the trial judge's distinction
"inapposite" and reversed. 291 Sketching the constitution's authorization for the tax district,29 2 the court viewed the "benefit" issue as
residing within the county's conclusive discretion, "except in the most
extreme cases."293 Relying primarily upon tax cases throughout its
opinion,94 the court finally turned to the assessment before it: "This
is not an extraordinary
case, and there is no evidence of abuse of legislative discretion. " 295
H.

Liability

Claimants sought several avenues around the Georgia county's historic
sovereign immunity during the survey period, enjoying varying (and
limited) degrees of success. 296 The plaintiff in Currid v.DeKalb State

288. 277 Ga. App. 350, 626 S.E.2d 541 (2006).
289. Id. at 350-51, 626 S.E.2d at 542-43. After creating the tax district and imposing
an assessment of $100 per parcel of land in the county, the commissioners entered into a
contract with the county hospital authority which would issue revenue bonds for indigent
care at the hospital with the county making bond payments from its assessments. The
bonds received validation in a proceeding before the county superior court without taxpayer
intervention. Id.
290. Id. at 352-53, 626 S.E.2d at 544. The trial court concluded that "the hospital
service assessment was not authorized because it did not provide a benefit to each parcel
of land owned by the Taxpayers." Id. at 352, 626 S.E.2d at 544.
291. Id. at 353, 626 S.E.2d at 544. The court noted that it was operating within "the
context of constitutionally authorized special districts and the powers provided to those
special districts. . . ." Id.
292. Id. at 352, 626 S.E.2d at 543-44 (citing GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, paras. 3, 6;
O.C.G.A. § 48-13-50.1 (2006)). "It follows that the county was authorized to create the
District for the purpose of providing health services." Id., 626 S.E.2d at 544.
293. Id. at 353, 626 S.E.2d at 544. As an example of an "extreme case," the court noted
City of Atlanta v. Hamlein, 96 Ga. 381, 23 S.E. 408 (1895). Id.
294. See, e.g., McLennan v. Aldredge, 223 Ga. 879, 159 S.E.2d 682 (1968); Bd. of
Comm'rs of Taylor County v. Cooper, 245 Ga. 251, 264 S.E.2d 193 (1980).
295. Higdon, 277 Ga. App. at 354, 626 S.E.2d at 545. The court thus reversed the trial
court's order setting aside the assessment. Id.
296. For perspective on county liability (and immunity), see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
GeorgiaLocal Government Tort Immunity: The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
19 (1985); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of'92, 9 GA.
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Court Probation Department297 sued under "The Community Service
Act" 298 for the wrongful death of a probationer while performing courtordered community service for the county's public works department.2 99
The statute imposes liability for gross negligence, 30 0 and the county
had assigned decedent to stand on the back of a garbage truck without
the requisite safety shoes.30 1 Under those circumstances, held the
court of appeals, the plaintiff had raised a jury question on the county's
0 2
gross negligence, thereby surviving a motion for summary judgment.
The court considered two instances pursued under the waiver of
immunity resulting from the local government's purchase of motor
Initially, Spalding County v. Blanvehicle liability insurance.0 3
chard, °4 a county inmate's action for injuries from a backhoe, °5
focused upon burden of proof.306 To the claimant's position that the

ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Liability Litigation:
Numerical Nuances, 38 GA. L. REV. 633 (2004).
297. 274 Ga. App. 704, 618 S.E.2d 621 (2005).
298. O.C.G.A. § 42-8-7 1 (1997). This statute "governs participation of probationers in
community service programs." Currid, 274 Ga. App. at 707, 618 S.E.2d at 624. The
county's public works department was an "agency" participating in the program. Id. at
704, 618 S.E.2d at 623.
299. Currid, 274 Ga. App. at 704, 618 S.E.2d at 623. The plaintiffs decedent had been
sentenced to twelve months probation and forty hours of community service. Upon
reporting for service, the decedent was assigned to the county sanitation department and
fell from the back of a garbage truck when it turned onto a side street at about fifteen
miles per hour. Id. at 705-06, 618 S.E.2d at 623-24.
300. See O.C.G.A. § 42-8-71(d) (limiting liability of a participating agency only for
actions "which constitute gross negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct").
301. Currid, 274 Ga. App. at 708-09, 618 S.E.2d at 625-26. Although the sanitation
department required certain safety shoes for workers, the decedent wore his own while
performing his service work. Id.
302. Id. at 709, 618 S.E.2d at 626. "On motion for summary judgment, we cannot
resolve the facts; a jury must decide whether this evidence supports a finding of gross
negligence." Id. The court thus reversed the trial court's grant of the county's motion. Id.
at 710, 618 S.E.2d at 626.
303. See O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (2005). For history and analysis of the statute, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Tort LiabilityInsurance in Georgia Local Government Law, 24 MERCER
L. REV. 651 (1973).
304. 275 Ga. App. 448, 620 S.E.2d 659 (2005).
305. Id. at 448, 620 S.E.2d at 659. The plaintiff had been assigned to a work detail
and, during the performance of his assignment, received injuries allegedly caused by a
correctional officer's misuse of a backhoe. Id.
306. Id. at 448-49, 620 S.E.2d at 660. Here, posited the court, "the question is whether
the plaintiff or the defendants bear the burden of showing waiver of a well-pled defense of
sovereign immunity." Id. The trial court had denied the county's motion for summary
judgment. Id.
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county had failed to show lack of waiver by the purchase of insurance,3 °7 the court was adamant: Sovereign immunity constitutes a
privilege that is subject to waiver, "'and the waiver must be established
by the party seeking to benefit from the waiver."'30° The plaintiff,
having "failed to point to any evidence" of insurance, also failed
summary judgment. °9
The other case, McElmurray v. Augusta-Richmond County,31 °
conceded the fact of insurance but queried whether the plaintiffs'
damages had arisen from the prerequisite county "use" of a motor
vehicle. 3 " There, the parties entered into an agreement under which
the county applied sewage sludge on the plaintiffs' fields for a period of
eleven years,312 allegedly causing damage to the plaintiffs' livestock
314
and lands.

3

"

The plaintiffs sued on a number of liability theories,

the county claimed sovereign immunity, and the plaintiffs pleaded
insurance waiver. The county having used trucks to apply the sludge,

307. Id. at 448, 620 S.E.2d at 660. "[The plaintiffl argued that the burden was on the
defendants to show that sovereign immunity had not been waived through the purchase
of insurance." Id.
308. Id. at 449, 620 S.E.2d at 660 (quoting Ga. Dep't of Human Res. v. Poss, 263 Ga.
347, 348, 434 S.E.2d 488, 490 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Hedquist v.
Merrill Lynch, 272 Ga. 209, 210, 528 S.E.2d 508, 510 (2000)).
309. Id. "[Tlhe trial court erred by denying summary judgment to the county, the
warden, and the correctional officer in their official capacities." Id.
310. 274 Ga. App. 605, 618 S.E.2d 59 (2005).
311. Id. at 610-11, 618 S.E.2d at 64-65. "O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(a) authorizes a municipal
corporation, a county, or any other political subdivision of this state to secure insurance to
cover liability for damages 'arising by reason of ownership, maintenance, operation, or use
of any motor vehicle.'" Id. at 610, 618 S.E.2d at 64.
312. Id. at 606, 618 S.E.2d at 61-62. The defendant developed a land application
program to dispose of sewage sludge and contacted farmers to promote the sludge as a
fertilizer. Id., 618 S.E.2d at 61. "Beginning in 1979, the [plaintiffs] entered into a series
of agreements under which they granted the [defendant] temporary licenses and easements
for the spreading of sewage sludge upon described tracts of land." Id.
313. Id., 618 S.E.2d at 62. "In the late 1980s, [the plaintiffs] began experiencing
significant problems with crop growth and production on their lands" and their cows "began
dying in excessive numbers." Id.
314. Id. at 606-07, 618 S.E.2d at 62. The plaintiffs alleged the county's misrepresentation of the sludge as a beneficial fertilizer and its concealment of metal contamination
rendered the sludge an environmental hazard. Id. at 606, 618 S.E.2d at 62. They sued the
county for "inverse condemnation, breach of contract, fraud, strict tort liability, negligence,
products liability, nuisance, trespass, conversion, and violation of the Georgia Hazardous
Site Response Act ('HSRA')." Id. at 605-06, 618 S.E.2d at 61. The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's decisions against plaintiffs on inverse condemnation (barred because
property owners consented to the actions), on violation of HSRA (does not expressly waive
sovereign immunity), and on breach of contract (statute of limitations had run). Id. at 608,
613-14, 618 S.E.2d at 63, 66-68.
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the claimants argued, the damage thus arose from the "use" of motor
vehicles.3 1 Agreeing, a sharply divided (four-to-three) court of appeals
reversed the trial judge's dismissal of the plaintiffs' tort claims.3 16
Statutes317 permitted local governments to waive their immunity for
claims arising from the negligent "use" of motor vehicles, the court
reasoned, and here "motor vehicles were ...

used to spread the sludge

on plaintiffs' lands."318
The "constitutional tort" exception to sovereign immunity 3 9 claimed
a period presence in Brown v. Dorsey,32 an action against the county
for its sheriff's murder of the sheriff-elect. Charging a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), the plaintiff alleged the sheriff's utilization of
department resources and manpower to kill her husband. He had acted,
21
she asserted, under color of state law and as county 32policymaker1
2 and state3 23
Reviewing the plaintiff's charges under both federal
315. See id. at 606, 618 S.E.2d at 62. See generally O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) (2005 &
Supp. 2006).
316. McElmurray, 274 Ga. App. at 609, 618 S.E.2d at 63. The court viewed the case
as controlled by Mitchell v. City of St. Marys, 155 Ga. App. 642, 271 S.E.2d 895 (1980),

where "the city was using a motor vehicle to spray a toxic chemical." McElmurray, 274 Ga.
App. at 612, 618 S.E.2d at 66.
317. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(a).
318. McElmurray, 274 Ga. App. at 613, 618 S.E.2d at 66. "The trial court thus erred
in dismissing [the plaintiffs'] tort claims on the ground that liability insurance for motor
vehicle use would not be applicable." Id. A spirited dissenting opinion for three judges
argued that "[blecause the damages claimed in this case did not occur as a result of the
county's negligent use of a motor vehicle, they are not covered by the liability insurance
purchased by the county." Id. at 620, 618 S.E.2d at 71 (Andrews, P.J., dissenting). Rather,
"[tihe damages claimed by [the plaintiffs] as a result of this sludge have no relation to the
manner in which the sludge was applied to the land and did not occur during the spreading
of the sludge." Id. at 621, 618 S.E.2d at 71 (Andrews, P.J., dissenting). The dissent relied
upon several earlier cases, including Harry v. Glynn County, 269 Ga. 503, 504 501 S.E.2d
196, 198 (1998) (holding that an ambulance was not in "use," although parts of diagnosis
and treatment were conducted while the appellant was being transported to the hospital
in the vehicle).
319. For treatment of the "constitutional tort" in Georgia local government law, see R.
PERRY SENTELL, JR., GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW'S AsSIMILATION OF MONELL:
SECTION 1983 AND THE NEW "PERSONS" (1984); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government
and Constitutional Torts: In the Georgia Courts, 49 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1997).

320. 276 Ga. App. 851, 625 S.E.2d 16 (2005).
321. Id. at 852, 625 S.E.2d at 18. "Specifically, she contends that the County is liable
to her for the death of her husband because [the sheriff] used the powers of his office to
accomplish the murder." Id.
322. Id. at 855, 625 S.E.2d at 21. The court found "very persuasive" the reasoning of
Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003). Id.
323. Id. at 855 n.25, 625 S.E.2d at 21 n.25. The court relied upon the Georgia Supreme
Court's decision in Bd. of Comm'rs of Dougherty County v. Saba, 278 Ga. 176, 598 S.E.2d
437 (2004). Id.
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precedent, the court of appeals delineated the precise status of a county
sheriff. "[T]he Constitution has made the sheriff independent from the
County, notwithstanding the designation of the sheriff as a 'county
officer.' ' s2 4 Moreover, the county possesses no control over the sheriff's
department personnel, 25 nor can the county control the manner in
which the sheriff spends his allocated funds. 326 "[Tihe trial court did
not err in dismissing the County as a party," the court concluded, since
the sheriff "was not a final policymaker for the County when he used
departmental personnel and resources to kill [his successor]." 2 7
Increasingly, claimants strive to circumvent sovereign immunity by
recasting their county lawsuits into actions against county officers and
employees personally.128 In this context, distinctions in both capacity
and function play inordinately significant roles. Officers sued in their
"official capacity" enjoy the county's "sovereign" or "governmental
immunity."129
Officers sued in their "individual capacity" enjoy
"qualified" or "official immunity" for "discretionary functions" performed
without malice or intent.3 0 Officers sued in their "individual capacity"
for "ministerial functions" enjoy neither "official immunity" nor
"sovereign immunity" for their negligent conduct.33 ' The survey period
instanced all varieties and results.
The court of appeals opinion in Wallace v. Greene County32 rang
most of the changes. There, a terminated employee sued the county

324. Id. at 856, 625 S.E.2d at 21.
325. Id. "Therefore, the County cannot be held liable under § 1983 for [the sheriffs]
use of those personnel in connection with his heinous plot to kill [the sheriff-elect]." Id.
326. Id. "In the absence of the ability to control the funds after they have been
allocated, the County cannot be held liable for the sheriffs use of departmental resources
to commit a § 1983 violation." Id.
327. Id. at 856-57, 625 S.E.2d at 21. Although conceding that Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati,475 U.S. 469 (1986), prevented it "from affirming the dismissal on the ground
that [the sheriffs] decision to murder [the sheriff-elect] was one discrete decision and not
a policy," the court rested its conclusion on the point that the sheriff "was a policymaker
for the state and not for the County with regard to the particular functions at issue." Id.
at 858-59, 625 S.E.2d at 23.
328. For treatment of the personal liability litigation in Georgia local government law,
see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights for Their Wrongs, 13
GA. L. REV. 747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local
Government Law: The Haunting Hiatus of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 405 (1993); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "Official Immunity" in Local Government Law: A
Quantifiable Confrontation, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 597 (2006).
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. 274 Ga. App. 776, 618 S.E.2d 642 (2005).
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manager and county attorney for obtaining an ex parte temporary
restraining order against him.333 Initially, the court discounted the
action against the officers in their "official capacity" as "in reality a suit
against the county itself' and "barred by sovereign immunity."334 As
for the claim against the defendants in their "individual capacity," the
court held their "decisions ... to seek a TRO in this case were not

ministerial, but rather, were discretionary acts."335 Accordingly, even
"construed as gross negligence,"336 their statutory violation
boded
33 7
"insufficient to deprive [the defendants] of official immunity."
335
Yielding a similar conclusion, Lancaster v. Effingham County
featured a taxpayers' suit against county commissioners for an alleged
assortment of unauthorized actions relating to the purchase, sale, and
rezoning of lands in constructing a water treatment plant. 9 Providing the most summary of dispositions, the court viewed the commissioners as having "exercised their discretion in connection with their official
duties," and absent malice or intent, "they are immune from personal
liability. ,340
Both the facts and the law presented closer questions for the court in
Hanse v. Phillips,34 a wrongful death claim for a motorist struck by

333. Id. at 776, 618 S.E.2d at 644. The plaintiff, the county's former building and
grounds maintenance superintendent, had a history of disciplinary problems on the job and
other officers and employees had complained to the defendants that the plaintiff's behavior
was erratic toward them. Id. at 777, 618 S.E.2d at 644. The plaintiff charged the
defendants with violating O.C.G.A. section 9-11-65(b) (2006) "when they obtained an ex
parte [temporary restraining order ('TRO')] against him without providing him notice as
the adverse party." Id. at 778, 618 S.E.2d at 645.
334. Id. at 778, 618 S.E.2d at 645-46.
335. Id. at 779, 618 S.E.2d at 646. "The manner in which concerns for public and
workplace safety should be addressed is not a simple, specific duty," said the court, and
official immunity extended "'to errors in the determination both of law and of fact.'" Id.
at 779-80,618 S.E.2d at 646 (quoting Partain v. Maddox, 131 Ga. App. 778, 782,206 S.E.2d
618, 621 (1974)).
336. Id. at 780, 618 S.E.2d at 647. '[The plaintiff] merely established that [the
defendants] failed to comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(b) in obtaining
the TRO." Id.
337. Id. "Accordingly, summary judgment as to [the plaintiffs] cause of action for
damages based on the ex parte TRO was proper under the official immunity doctrine." Id.
338. 273 Ga. App. 544, 615 S.E.2d 777 (2005).
339. Id. at 544, 615 S.E.2d at 778. The court upheld the county's power to take the
various actions challenged. Id.
340. Id. at 547, 615 S.E.2d at 780. The court thus affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to the defendants. Id.
341. 276 Ga. App. 558, 623 S.E.2d 746 (2005), cert. granted.
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a suspect fleeing the defendant police officer.34 2 The plaintiffs charged
violation of a "General Orders Manual" which vested the officer with
pursuit responsibility but prohibited his "ramming" a fleeing vehicle. 3"
The trial court found a factual issue on whether the officer intentionally
rammed the suspect, and "'whether this action was willful, wanton and
reckless.'" '
Reversing, a four-judge majority in the court of appeals
forcefully characterized the officer's pursuit as "discretionary" conduct:
"That he may have done so in contravention of certain directives in the
policy manual does not change this pursuit into a ministerial function." 345 Moreover, the court adamantly rejected the trial judge's
rationale: "Willful, wanton and reckless conduct does not equate with
346
the actual malice necessary to defeat a claim of official immunity."
Finally, the court reached its limit-and drew a crucial distinction-in
Leake v. Murphy,347 an action for a stranger's attack upon an elementary school student on school premises. 34 s The plaintiffs sued the
county school superintendent and members of the school board

4

1

for

342. Id. at 559, 623 S.E.2d at 747. The pursuit originated with the suspect's allegedly
striking an officer conducting a road safety check and concluded with his crashing into the
decedent's car. Plaintiffs sued the pursuing officer in his individual capacity. Id. at 55860, 623 S.E.2d at 747-48.
343. Id. at 560, 623 S.E.2d at 748. "The manual also provides that '[d]elibrate physical
contact between any two vehicles at any time will not be justified,' and an '[olfficer will not
bump or ram a fleeing vehicle.'" Id.
344. Id. at 563, 623 S.E.2d at 750. "T]he trial court's order concludes that although
the decision to initiate and continue a chase was discretionary, [the defendant] did not
have discretion to violate county policy during the chase. The court found issues of fact as
to whether [the defendant] had intentionally rammed the SUV." Id. at 560-61, 623 S.E.2d
at 748.
345. Id. at 562, 623 S.E.2d at 749.
346. Id. at 563, 623 S.E.2d at 750. "Here, there is nothing in the record which
demonstrates any deliberate intention on the part of [the officer] to do a wrongful act or
any intention to cause harm to [the decedent]." Id. at 564, 623 S.E.2d at 750. A dissenting
opinion for three judges argued as follows: "[The officer] ... was required to follow a
simple, clear-cut directive that absolutely prohibited him from deliberately bumping or
ramming a fleeing vehicle ....
[Tihe officer was therefore under a ministerial duty not to
do just that. Whether he did so is a question of fact to be decided by a jury." Id. at 566,
623 S.E.2d at 752 (Phipps, J., dissenting).
347. 274 Ga. App. 219, 617 S.E.2d 575 (2005).
348. Id. at 219, 617 S.E.2d at 577. A paranoid schizophrenic walked through the
school's front doors armed with a hammer and, coming upon a row of fourth grade students
in a hallway, swung the hammer at the plaintiffs' child and embedded the metal claws in
her skull. Id. at 221, 617 S.E.2d at 577.
349. Id. at 219, 617 S.E.2d at 577. The plaintiffs also sued the school principal and her
office staff for failing to comply with school policies and procedures on access and
monitoring adopted after a previous incident, but the court affirmed the trial judge's
decision that they had failed to perform a discretionary act and were thus entitled to
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negligence in failing to develop a statutorily required school safety
plan,35 ° only to suffer the trial court's dismissal. 5 1 On appeal, the
court of appeals highlighted the statute: it "mandates the preparation of
a school safety plan which addresses security issues for every public
school in this state."352 The duty imposed, the court declared, "is
absolute," thus "ministerial;"3

3

and the defendants' nonperformance

received no protection by official immunity.3M It followed "that the
trial court erred in dismissing that portion of the complaint which
alleges that the Superintendent and the Board members failed to
develop a safety plan for the school ...

,

With the case thus resolved "[a]t this procedural juncture," 56 the
court nevertheless (and gratuitously) proceeded to extend its analysis.
Accordingly, it took express issue with the plaintiffs' further contention
"that the manner in which a school safety plan is prepared, and its
ultimate contents, require solely the performance of ministerial
functions."3
Rather, the material statute clearly indicated that "the
development of the contents and manner of enforcement of a school
safety plan are discretionary functions."3 58 Here, the court reiterated,
"[it is the total absence of any plan which precludes dismissal of the
lawsuit." 359

Alternatively, however, "if a

motion for

summary

judgment is filed and evidence of a plan that predates the attack... 3 is0
presented, the defendants would be entitled to official immunity."

official immunity from liability. Id. at 220, 617 S.E.2d at 577.
350. See O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1185 (2005).
351. Leake, 274 Ga. App. at 220, 617 S.E.2d at 577. 'The defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint on the basis of official immunity, and the trial court granted the motion."

Id.
352. Id. at 222, 617 S.E.2d at 578. According to the court, "O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1185 states
in part: 'Every public school shall prepare a school safety plan to help curb the growing
incidence of violence in schools. . . .'" Id. at 221, 617 S.E.2d at 578 (emphasis in original).
353. Id. at 221, 617 S.E.2d at 578. "No exceptions are listed. Thus, the duty to prepare
such a plan for a public school is ministerial, not discretionary." Id., 617 S.E.2d at 579.
354. Id. at 224, 617 S.E.2d at 580.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 223, 617 S.E.2d at 579. "In terms of immunity, however, the duty to
prepare the plan must be distinguished from its contents." Id. at 222, 617 S.E.2d at 579.
358. Id. at 224, 617 S.E.2d at 579. The court noted the statute's requirement of input
from a variety of individuals and that it gave no specific directions on what elements to
include in the plan. Id. at 223, 617 S.E.2d at 579. "These procedures would necessarily
differ from school to school, and addressing these issues is left to the discretion of the
school authorities." Id.
359. Id. at 224, 617 S.E.2d at 580.
360. Id. Apparently, this would be the result virtually irrespective of the contents of
such a plan. See id., 617 S.E.2d at 579-80.
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At that "procedural juncture," the court finally took its leave of the
litigation. 6 1
I.

Zoning

The plaintiff in Buckner v. Douglas County362 sought enforcement of
a letter from the county allowing development of his property under a
prior zoning ordinance"6 no longer in effect at the time he purchased
the property.3 " According to the court of appeals, the county's letter,
although not a textual amendment, "constituted an amendment to the
zoning ordinance rezoning (or perhaps re-rezoning) the property from
"..."365
As such, the "amendment" fell
one classification to another .
within the mandate of the Zoning Procedures Law.. requiring a preamendment notice and hearing." 7 Minus those prerequisites, the
"amendment" constituted a nullity "'without any legal force or effect,' 3Ns and conferring the plaintiff no additional rights in his property.369 The court thus affirmed the trial judge's refusal to enforce the
county's agreement.37 °
The supreme court considered an issue of constitutionality in Legacy
Investment Group, LLC v. Kenn, 1 more specifically the plaintiff's
attack upon the present zoning of its property.372 Reviewing expert

361. Id., 617 S.E.2d at 580.
362. 273 Ga. App. 765, 615 S.E.2d 850 (2005).
363. DOUGLAS COUNTY, GA., CODE app. A, § 70.140.4.c (2001) (amended in 2002 by
adding app. A, § 70.140.4.c(2)(c)).
364. Buckner, 273 Ga. App. at 765, 615 S.E.2d at 851. The plaintiff entered into an
agreement to purchase the property in April; the county amended its zoning ordinance to
more restrictive requirements (three-acre lots) in May; in September, the county agreed
that the plaintiff could develop under the former less restrictive (one-acre lots) requirements; and the plaintiff concluded his purchase of the property the following February.
Subsequently, the county refused to issue the plaintiff building permits because his plans
did not comply with the more restrictive requirements. The plaintiff sought to mandamus
the county's compliance with its letter. Id. at 765-66, 615 S.E.2d at 851-52.
365. Id. at 768, 615 S.E.2d at 853.
366. See generally O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1 to -6 (2005).
367. Buckner, 273 Ga. App. at 768, 615 S.E.2d at 853.
368. Id., 615 S.E.2d at 854 (quoting Yost v. Fulton County, 256 Ga. 324, 325, 348
S.E.2d 638, 640 (1986)).
369. Id. at 768-69, 615 S.E.2d at 854.
370. Id. at 765, 615 S.E.2d at 851. The court affirmed the trial court's order "that the
settlement agreement is unenforceable because it amounts to a zoning decision rendered
in violation of Georgia's Zoning Procedures Law (ZPL)." Id.
371. 279 Ga. 778, 621 S.E.2d 453 (2005).
372. Id. at 778, 621 S.E.2d at 454. The plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase
the property in January 2003, suffered the county's denial of a request to rezone in May,
and then purchased the property in January 2004. Under existing zoning, the plaintiff
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testimony in the case, 373 the court concluded as follows: "[Tihe
dence authorizes the inferences that [the plaintiff]... would have
to pay as much as $9,000 per acre for the property, and that
property could only be feasibly developed if [it] had purchased
property for $5,838.",37
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That evidence thus authorized "an inference

that [the plaintiff] could not feasibly develop the property for residential
use." 75 Accordingly, the court found an existing factual issue "regarding whether the existing zoning is significantly detrimental to [the
376 and reversed the trial court's summary judgment for the
plaintiff]"
3 77
county.
III.

LEGISLATION

The public controversy arising over the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Kelo v. City of New London 378 ensured the center-piece
prominence of eminent domain in the 2006 regular session of the
Georgia General Assembly. 379 In a drastic overhaul of existing statutory law, the legislature moved to restrict both the substance and the
process of condemnation. 8s Essentially, the revisions confine the power
of exercising eminent domain to elected governing bodies and sharply
limit the purposes for which private property may be condemned.3 81

could build one single-family residence on each acre, but under the requested rezoning, the
plaintiff could build two residences on each acre. Id. at 779, 621 S.E.2d at 454-55.
373. Id. at 781, 621 S.E.2d at 456. For the plaintiff to prevail on its claim of
unconstitutionality, said the court, "it had 'the burden to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the existing zoning (1) causes [it] a significant detriment, and (2) is not
substantially related to the public health, safety, morality, and welfare.'" Id. at 780, 621
S.E.2d at 456 (quoting Town of Tyrone v. Tyrone, LLC, 275 Ga. 383, 385, 565 S.E.2d 806,
809 (2002) (brackets in original)).
374. Id. at 781, 621 S.E.2d at 456. The court refused to resolve whether plaintiff paid
a premium price for the property or the county's contention "that a developer should not
be able to purchase land at a greater-than-market cost and then use that cost to prove a
significant detriment." Id. Here, said the court, it would rely only on both parties' experts
regarding the property's fair market value. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 782, 621 S.E.2d at 456.
377. Id., 621 S.E.2d at 457. Without analysis of the point, the court also found an issue
of fact remaining on whether the existing zoning was not substantially related to the public
welfare. Id.
378. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
379. The legislative measures summarized are drawn from two helpful reports: "Final
Legislative Report," published by Association County Commissioners of Georgia (Apr.
2006), and "2006 Legislative Update," published by the Georgia Municipal Association
(June 2006).
380. Ga. H.B. 1313, Reg. Sess. (2006); Ga. H. Res. 1306, Reg. Sess. (2006).
381. Id.
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Restraining the condemnation power for redevelopment purposes to
"blighted" property, the statute sets forth specific conditions necessary
to qualify a property as "blighted" and increases compensation for
condemnees. 8 2 Similarly, the term "public use" receives restriction to
basic governmental purposes."' 3 Procedurally, the statute mandates
increased judicial review of eminent domain cases, specifies new notice
requirements, provides for an owner's reacquiring property not put to
public use, and imposes court costs upon the local government when an
owner successfully excepts to the special master's award proceeding."'I
The session yielded several notable items in the realms of finances and
taxation. For example, local governments issuing bonds in excess of five
million dollars must arrange for annual performance audits or reviews
by an outside auditor or consultant, the audits revealing whether bonds
funds are being spent in an efficient manner.38 5 In a different context,
and for a residential property taxpayer's appeal to superior court, the
legislature required the government to pay litigation costs when the
court establishes a value for the property that is fifteen percent less than
the value set by the board of assessors. 88
In the area of governmental regulation, the legislature enumerated six
methods for governments to calculate regulatory fees.387 Moreover, the
statute allows the service provider to pay the regulatory fees within two
days after initiating the service, if necessary for health or safety of the
service recipient. 8 8 The General Assembly also addressed the process
of building plan reviews. If a local government is unable to perform a
building plan review within thirty days of a request, the builder or
developer may contract with a professional engineer or architect to
undertake the review. 389 The individual or firm requesting the review
bears the cost, and the private provider must attest to compliance with
applicable codes and maintain liability insurance coverage. 9 ' Finally,
local governments are now preempted from regulating the sale of
fireworks beyond those regulations provided by state law.3 9 '

382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Ga.
requirement
386. Ga.
387. Ga.
388. Id.
389. Ga.
390. Id.
391. Ga.

H.B. 1012, Reg. Sess. (2006). The local government may opt out of the
by publishing a legal advertisement that it is doing so. Id.
S.B. 597, Reg. Sess. (2006).
H.B. 304, Reg. Sess. (2006).
H.B. 1385, Reg. Sess. (2006).
H.B. 304.
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Local governments are empowered-in their judicial facilities-to
maintain a display described as the "Foundations of American Law and
Government.", 9 2 The display includes the Mayflower Compact, the
Declaration of Independence, the Magna Carta, the Ten Commandments,
and the Bill of Rights; it is to require no state funding. 93
Georgia's legislative response to the issues of immigration and
undocumented workers includes provisions addressed prospectively to
local governments.3 94 The statute requires that every political subdivision verify the legal status of applicants for state or local benefits as
defined by the federal work authorization program which includes
grants, contracts, loans, and professional licenses provided by a state or
local government. 95
Environmental concerns surfaced in a statute updating and consolidating measures relating to littering. 39 6 The statute clarifies definitions,
increases fines, and mandates that convictions for "egregious littering"
be published in the local government's legal organ.3 97 Yet another
398
measure prohibits billboards that advertise sexual entertainment;
the statute also prohibits local governments from regulating political
campaign signs on private property in respect to number of signs and
length of time posted. 99
Finally, the legislature authorized the
Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority to make loans and grants to
local governments for land conservation projects in accordance with the
Georgia Land Conservation Act.400
Law enforcement and public safety drew the General Assembly's
attention on several fronts. The "TASER and Electronic Control
Weapons Act"40 1 requires training every two years in the use of tasers
and stun guns by local government law enforcement personnel. The
training program must be approved by the Public Officer Standards and
Training Council, and the law enforcement agency must possess written
policies on the use of the devices.40 2 A municipal or county governing
authority is now authorized, without action by the Governor, to offer and

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Ga. H.B. 941, Reg. Sess. (2006).
Id.
Ga. S.B. 529, Reg. Sess. (2006).
Id.
Ga. H.B. 1320, Reg. Sess. (2006).
Id.
Ga. H.B. 1097, Reg. Sess. (2006).
Id.
Ga. H.B. 1319, Reg. Sess. (2006).
Ga. H.B. 1019, Reg. Sess. (2006).
Id.
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pay a reward for the detention or apprehension of felons;4"3 each fulltime local law enforcement agency may utilize one properly-marked
vehicle without a roof-mounted lightbar for the purpose of traffic
enforcement;4. 4 and law enforcement officers may now utilize allterrain vehicles (properly marked and equipped) on the public roads. °6
Finally, local government probation officers are now subject to the same
requirements as set forth by the County and Municipal Probation
Management Council for private probation officers.40"
Having failed to enact a bill requiring county commission approval of
municipal annexation pursuant to a property owner's request, the
General Assembly adopted a resolution exhorting city and county
advocates "to make every effort" at resolving their annexation problems.40 7 The resolution calls upon the Georgia Municipal Association
and the Association County Commissioners to prepare legislation
accomplishing an annexation solution for the legislature's consideration
in 2007. 4°
IV.

CONCLUSION

The development of local government law, both decisional and
legislative, surged significantly during the survey period. Cresting the
tides of popular passions and temporal tensions, the evolution manifested an agenda of all persuasions. Distinctive beneath its roiling surface,
however, an unchanging reflection: a farmer, with shotgun, standing at
the fence.

403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Id.

H.B. 1302, Reg. Sess. (2006).
S.B. 64, Reg. Sess. (2006).
H.B. 1216, Reg. Sess. (2006).
S.B. 44, Reg. Sess. (2006).
S. Res. 1315, Reg. Sess. (2006).

